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1
Alternative Economic Indicators
C. James Hueng
Western Michigan University

Policymakers and business practitioners are eager to gain access
to reliable information on the state of the economy for timely decision making. Traditional economic indicators have been criticized
for delayed reporting, out-of-date methodology, and neglecting some
aspects of the economy. Recent advances in economic theory, econometrics, and information technology have fueled research in building
broader, more accurate, and higher-frequency economic indicators. The
2018–2019 Werner Sichel Lecture Series invited six prominent economists to speak on their current research on alternative economic indicators, including indicators in the financial market, indicators for business cycles, and indicators of economic uncertainty. Their lectures have
been compiled in this volume.
In Chapter 2, William Barnett and Kun He argue that the growing
complexity of financial instruments has made the traditional simple-sum
monetary aggregates such as M1–M4 obsolete. The authors outline the
evidence showing how the Fed’s simple-sum monetary aggregates have
provided misleading information about the economy and monetary policy. In contrast, they show how their Divisia monetary aggregates have
been more in line with the true liquidity conditions in the economy.
Unlike the simple-sum aggregates, which assume that all monetary
components contribute equally to the aggregate, the Divisia monetary
aggregates weight the growth of each component using a formula based
upon its user cost to reflect its liquidity in making transactions. Barnett
and He describe the latest efforts in constructing the Divisia monetary
aggregates by incorporating credit card services and distinguishing
between the demand-side and the supply-side money services.
In Chapter 3, Scott Brave introduces the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) and Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index
(ANFCI) as measures of the overall financial market condition pro-
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vided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The latter is adjusted
for the state of the business cycle and the level of inflation. Since the
global financial crisis, economists at the Chicago Fed have constructed
composite indices that aim to measure the overall tightness of the U.S.
financial system. The NFCI is a weekly summary statistic estimated
by a mixed-frequency dynamic factor model on a panel of 105 weekly,
monthly, and quarterly financial time series. In the chapter, Brave shows
that the index aligns closely with the historical episodes of financial
stress and has been a useful tool in monitoring financial stability.
As to alternative business cycle indicators, numerous efforts have
been devoted to replacing the traditional GDP measure. Many have
adopted data-dimension reduction techniques such as principal components analysis and dynamic factor analysis to extract as much information from as many variables as efficiently as possible. Brave introduces
the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), a monthly summary
statistic for U.S. economic growth estimated by principal components
analysis using 85 monthly indicators. The CFNAI has been shown to be
roughly 95 percent accurate historically in identifying U.S. recessions
(as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) since 1967.
Based on a dynamic factor model, the New York Fed Staff Nowcast is an early estimate of GDP growth for the current and subsequent
quarters. In Chapter 4, Domenico Giannone and his coauthors, Patrick
Adams, Eric Qian, Argia Sbordone, and Mihir Trivedi, present in detail
this automated platform for monitoring U.S. macroeconomic conditions in real time. This nowcasting model synthesizes a large number of
variables (macroeconomic big data) monitored by economists, incorporating new information within minutes of the data releases. It is entirely
automated and mimics best practices without relying on any subjective judgment. This platform provides a model-based counterpart to the
analysis traditionally based on expert knowledge. The authors show
that the New York Fed Staff Nowcast provided accurate early estimates
of the U.S. GDP during the Great Recession.
In Chapter 5, Alessandro Barbarino and Chiara Scotti provided an
estimate of the probability of a recession occurring in 2019 by comparing various models and employing a mix of macroeconomic and
financial indicators, including the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) real
business condition index and Scotti’s surprise and uncertainty indexes,
explained below. The ADS index, maintained and updated by the Phila-
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delphia Fed, is derived from a dynamic factor model as well. It is a daily
index that measures the latent real business conditions in real time,
emphasizing that a business cycle is about the dynamics and interactions of many economic indicators from various frequencies. The surprise and uncertainty indexes are daily measures of surprises and uncertainty about the U.S. real activity, as measured by the ADS index. Scotti
and Barbarino conclude that real variables are more powerful in signaling recessions at shorter horizons, while financial variables are valuable
leading indicators at longer horizons. Their model, using real variables,
did not show a high recession probability in 2019 (as of mid-March of
that year), contrary to what was suggested by the Congressional Budget
Office and several published surveys.
In addition to Scotti’s index of uncertainty about the real activity, the following chapter presents another index for uncertainty—the
economic policy uncertainty index. In Chapter 6, Steven Davis details
the construction of the index and highlights the effect of the shift in
U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration on economic uncertainty. The index is constructed from newspaper coverage of policyrelated economic uncertainty by using computer-automated newspaper
searches. Davis shows that the U.S.-China conflict over trade and commercial policies has become a major source not only of economic policy uncertainty but also of increased equity market volatility. The trade
conflict, however, has a limited impact on U.S. domestic investment.
Conversely, the Chinese economy is more vulnerable to trade policy
shocks and uncertainty.
In the past decade, thanks to revolutions in computer science, engineering, and geography, data compiled by sensors on satellites have
become publicly accessible for researchers. The satellite night lights
data have been increasingly used by social scientists as an alternative
measure of economic activity. In the book’s final chapter, Adam Storeygard highlights six key advantages of using satellite data for economic research and policymaking. These include 1) providing data for
data-poor contexts, 2) high spatial resolution, 3) low-cost repeat measurements, 4) data available for the whole world, 5) consistency across
borders of different systems, and 6) avoiding possible data manipulations by traditional data collectors. Storeygard provides examples of
research on deforestation, pollution, urban growth, transportation, and
political economy. Although not a complete substitute for traditional
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administrative or survey data, the satellite night lights technology holds
great promise as the cost of obtaining these data goes down and the
algorithms for analyzing them keep advancing.
All the economic indicators presented in the lecture series are publicly available. They are so well accepted that researchers around the
world have been adopting the presented ideas and methodologies to
build comparable indicators for many countries. Looking ahead, we
expect emerging technologies in big data platforms and artificial intelligence to further advance the research in how data are collected and analyzed, which should lead to more innovative and informative economic
indicators, resulting in better policymaking and business decisions.

2
Getting It Wrong
How Faulty Monetary Statistics Undermine
the Fed, the Financial System, and the Economy
William A. Barnett
University of Kansas and Center for Financial Stability
Kun He
University of Kansas

Barnett (2012) documented the degree to which faulty monetary statistics have tended to undermine the Federal Reserve System (the Fed),
the financial system, and the economy. That MIT Press book, which
brings together nearly a half century of research on that subject, won
a Professional and Scholarly Excellence (PROSE) Award for the best
book published in economics during 2012, presented by the Association
of American Publishers. The research in the book is primarily based
on the use of the Divisia monetary aggregates, originated by Barnett
(1980) and made available to the public by the Center for Financial
Stability (CFS) in New York City. But newer, more sophisticated monetary aggregates are now available from the CFS. The new aggregates
incorporate credit card services into the Divisia monetary aggregates,
and they distinguish between the demand-side total monetary services
consumed and the supply-side inside-money services associated with
value added in financial intermediation. This chapter begins the process
of updating Barnett (2012) to use the newer data, but with the need for
more sophisticated econometric tests in the frequency domain.
Supply-side inside-money aggregates and demand-side total monetary aggregates are not equal, since total demand-side monetary aggregates include outside money not produced as outputs of private financial
intermediaries. As economic indicators, they may perform differently
in the short run and in the long run. Divisia monetary aggregates, on
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the demand side or supply side, can be expected to perform even better when credit-card transaction services are taken into account. In this
chapter, we empirically compare credit card–augmented inside-money
supply-side Divisia aggregates and total-money demand-side Divisia
aggregates. In particular, we compare their correlations with major
economic policy targets in the short term and long term. To acquire
dynamic performances for time-series data at different frequencies, we
transform their time series into the frequency domain using spectral
analysis methods. Spectral coherence between the Divisia indexes and
major final targets of policy at different frequencies can provide evidence of the role of inside-money supply-side Divisia and total-money
demand-side Divisia in the short run and long run.
The original Divisia monetary aggregates measure demand-side
monetary services using the economic aggregation and index number
theory developed by Barnett (1980). The data are available from the
Center for Financial Stability (CFS) in New York City. On the demand
side, there is no reason to differentiate among inside money, outside
money, regulated services, or shadow banking services. Demanders
consume liquidity services supplied by all relevant sources. On the supply side, the manner in which the monetary services are produced is
highly relevant to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and
to the indicator value of the resulting service flows.
On the supply side, traditionally, outside money has been measured
as the monetary base, supplied by the Federal Reserve as the sum of
currency and bank reserves. Inside money has been calculated as the
difference between the total-money supply, measured as a simple sum,
and outside money. In recent years, that measure of inside money has
become conspicuously defective, with M1 inside money often being
negative, despite the fact that most of the monetary services in the economy are now produced by private banks as value added in banking and,
hence, properly representing inside money.
In recent decades, transaction and liquidity services have been augmented dramatically by the growth of privately supplied unregulated
monetary services from bank-supplied credit cards and from the services provided by unregulated shadow banking. We consider inside
money using aggregation and index number theory, not simple-sum
accounting, and we augment our aggregates with credit-card service
flows. We believe that the relationship between inside-money services
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on the supply side, total monetary services on the demand side, and final
targets of policy can differ at different frequencies, since the transmission mechanism behaves differently in the short run from the long run.
Exploring those extensions of Barnett (2012) would best be done
using harmonic analysis. As a first step in that direction, we investigate the properties of the data in the frequency domain using spectral
analysis. But that approach, while being the appropriate first step in
the intended direction, requires stationary data, which lose relevant
information about the dynamics of the economy and of the monetary
transmission mechanism. In addition, that approach is heavily samplesize dependent. In subsequent research, we plan to extend this approach
to the time-frequency domain using wavelets, in accordance with the
approach in Barnett, Ftiti, and Jawadi (2019). This chapter contains our
first steps in that direction.

CREDIT CARD–AUGMENTED DIVISIA
Using accounting conventions, credit cards cannot be aggregated
with monetary assets, since monetary assets are assets and credit-card
balances are liabilities. Accounting conventions do not permit adding
liabilities to assets. But aggregation and index number theory aggregate over service flows, regardless of whether produced by assets or
liabilities. As shown by Barnett and Su (2020), services of credit cards
and of monetary assets can be aggregated using aggregation and index
number theory.
These are the definitions of variables used in Barnett and Su’s
(2020) model:
Rt = expected yield on the benchmark asset, representing the rate of
return on pure capital;
μt = vector of real balances, μit , of monetary asset deposit-account type
i during period t;
τt = vector of real expenditure volumes, τjt , with credit-card type j for
transactions during period t;
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et = vector of expected interest rates, eit , on τt ;
ςt = vector of rotating real balances, ς jt , in credit-card type j during
period t from transactions in previous periods;
ēt = vector of expected interest rates on ςt ;
ct = real balances of excess reserves held by the intermediary during
period t;
Lt = vector of labor quantities receiving expected wage rates, ωt , during
period t ;
zt = quantities of other factors of production;
ct = price of the factor zt ;
kt = reserve requirements, where kit is the reserve requirement applicable to μit , and 0 ≤ kit ≤ 1 for all I;
Rdt = Federal Reserve expected discount rate;
_
Rt = min{Rt , Rdt } ;
γt = vector of expected yields paid by the firm on it ; and
p*t = true cost of living index, used to deflate nominal balances to real
balances.
The vector γt is defined so that the nominal user-cost price for produced
monetary asset it is

γ it = pt*

(1− kit ) Rt − ρit
1+ Rt

.

The vector π is defined so that the nominal expected user-cost price
for produced credit card services, τjt , is

π jt = pt*

e jt − Rt
1+ Rt

.

The vector σt is defined so that the nominal expected user-cost price
for carried-forward rotating credit card debt, ς jt , is
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σ jt = pt*

e jt − Rt
.
1+ Rt

The nominal expected user-cost price of excess reserves, ct , is

γ 0t = pt*

Rt
.
1+ Rt

The corresponding expected real user costs are

γ 0t
γ t π t σt
pt* , pt* , pt* , and pt* .
Based on the aggregator function existence assumption of technology weakly separable in produced monetary asset service, the Divisia
money index for produced inside-money services is acquired by solving
the financial intermediary’s decision problem. The result is
*s
log M t*s − log M =
t −1

∑ s (log µ
i

it

*
it

− log µi*,t −1 ) + ∑ µ jt (log τ *jt − log τ *j ,t −1 ) ,
i

where M = the economic output quantity aggregate for financial firms.
*
t

sit
Here,=

1
( sit + si,t −1 ) , with sit and ujt computed from
2

(

)

sit = µit*γ it / μt*γ t + γ t*' π t , and ujt is the solution to the constrained revenue maximizing problem:
*'
*'
Max μt γ t + γ t π t subject to f ( μt , τ t , kt ) = M t* .

Unlike conventional accounting inside money, the CFS credit card–
augmented Divisia inside-money aggregates correlate very well with
nominal GDP and can serve the central purposes of inside money, long
contemplated in the literature on monetary economics. Further knowledge of its properties remains to be discovered and explored in the frequency domain.
The primary differences between the supply-side measure and the
CFS demand-side Divisia monetary aggregates is the supply side’s
inclusion of credit card services and exclusion of currency and Treasury bills.
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Another difference between the demand-side and the supply-side
user-cost formulas for monetary asset services results from the existence of reserve requirements, producing an implicit tax on banks. But
in recent years, that tax has been nearly zero because of sweeps, low
interest rates, and Federal Reserve payment of interest on reserves.
In this chapter, we begin our empirical exploration of the insidemoney and total credit card–augmented Divisia for broad M4 and narrow M1, beginning from July 2007. Moving from DM1 (Divisia Ma)
to the higher levels of aggregation incorporates increasing amounts of
shadow banking and negotiable money-market security liquidity services, properly weighted.

SPECTRAL ANALYSIS THEORY
For a finite series u( j) of length T = NΔt, here with N referring to
the sample size and Δt referring to the sampling periodicity, the discrete
Fourier transform (DFT) U(k) of u( j) and its inverse (IDFT) for finite
series (see, e.g., Iacobucci [2005]) are
U (k ) =

1
N

∑

u ( j ) e −i 2π jk / N

N −1
j=0

and
( N −1) /2

u ( j ) = ∑ k = −[ N /2]U ( k ) ei 2π jk / N ,

where uk =

k
is the frequency and T = NΔt is the time. In our power
N Dt

spectrum for real data in later parts of the paper, the label for frequency
domain is vk , and the period should be 1/vk . The power spectrum is
given by
Pu(k) = |U(k)|2 .
An estimator for the power spectrum is given by Schuster’s
Periodogram:
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Pu ( k ) = ∆t ∑ J =
γ ( J ) cos
−( N −1) uu

2π Jk
,
N

−J
u j − u )( u ( j + J ) − u ) is the
where γ uu ( J ) = γ uu ( −J ) = N −1 ∑ Nj=
−( N − J ) ( ( )

standard sample estimation at lag J of the autocovariance function.
To build a spectral estimator, which is more stable—i.e., it has a
smaller variance than Pu (k)—we turn to the technique of windowing.
This technique is employed both in time and in frequency domain to
smooth all abrupt variations and to minimize the spurious fluctuations
generated in time as a series is truncated. The smoothed spectrum is
given by
N −1

Ŝu ( k ) = ∆t ∑ J =
ω ( J ) γ uu ( J ) cos
−( N −1) M

2π Jk
,
N

where the autocovariance function is weighted by the lag window ω( j)
of width M. It can be shown that this is equivalent to splitting the series
in N/M subseries of length M, computing their spectra, and taking their
mean with the spectral window WM (k) of width M = M − 1.
For two time series, u1( j) and u2( j), with cross covariance γ12(J) =
γ12(−J) , the cross spectrum is
N −1
ω ( J ) γ 12 ( J ) e −i 2π Jk / N =
Sˆ12 ( k ) = ∆t ∑ J =
Cˆ12 ( k ) − iQˆ12 ( k ) .
−( N −1)

Here, the real part Ĉ12( j) is the cospectrum, and the imaginary part is
the iQˆ12 ( j) quadrature spectrum. The coherency spectrum (correlation
coefficient) is
Kˆ 12 (k ) =

Sˆ12 (k )
Sˆ1 (k ) Sˆ1 (k )

=

Cˆ12 (k ) 2 + Qˆ12 (k ) 2
Sˆ1 (k ) Sˆ1 (k )

The phase spectrum (time lag) is
ˆ (k)= arctan(− Q̂12 (k ) ) ,
Φ
12
Ĉ12 (k )

.
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which measures the phase difference between the frequency components of the two series: 1) the number of leads (> 0) or 2) the number of
lags (< 0) of u1( j) on u2 ( j).
DATA
Regarding the data sources, see Barnett and Su (2020). The credit
card transaction services can be measured by the transaction volumes
summed over four sources: Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and
Discover. The credit-card-augmented Divisia aggregate does not apply
to debit cards, nor to store cards, nor to charge cards not providing a line
of credit. The model identifies credit card services as sources of value
added in banking and therefore outputs of financial intermediation,
since those credit card accounts provide deferred payment services.
Cash and checking accounts do not provide that service. Debit cards
do not, either. The services of debit cards are similar to the services of
checking accounts, which are already included as services of demand
deposit accounts but are not the source of value added we identify as
credit card services.
Store cards are not outputs of financial intermediation, since they
are maintained by the stores that supply the purchased products. In
addition, the connection between store cards and those products sold
by the stores is inconsistent with the assumption of blockwise weak
separability of financial services and consumer goods on the demand
side, since these cards can be used only to purchase the goods sold by
the store. Charge cards that do not provide a line of credit are rarely
provided by banks, and they are now largely limited to store cards.

SPECTRAL ANALYSIS RESULTS
The year-over-year growth rate for credit card–augmented insidemoney and total-money Divisia are provided on the website of the
Center of Financial Stability(CFS), dated from July 2007 to October
2018; the U.S. unemployment rate and CPI (consumer price index) are
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provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the U.S. inflation rate,
along with inflation rates internationally, is provided by statbureau.org
from July 2007 to April 2018. The total sample size is N = 136, but 131
for the inflation rate.
All data are monthly data, corresponding to periodicity of Δt = one
month. All time series data were detrended when spectrum estimated.
Here we chose modified Daniell smoothers as the smoothing function,
with moving averages giving half weight to the end values. The smooth
width M = 8 determines the trade-off between bias and variance for a
fixed sample size. The larger the value of M, the smaller the variance of
the estimated spectrum at a given frequency, but the larger the bias. To
get a smoothed estimated spectrum without losing excessive information, we set M = 8.
Since the original value of the year-over-year growth rate of Divisia index is small, the power spectrum remains small after estimation.
However, the periodic properties for coherence between inside-money
Divisia and total-money Divisia, and with unemployment rate, inflation
rate, and CPI index, are clear.
In the plots below, we have sample size N = 136 with an 11-year
time range, from 2007 to 2018. Frequency domain results, with the frequency set at vk = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, correspond to periods of 1/vk
= 10.0, 5.0, 3.3, 2.5, and 2.0 months, respectively. Although there is
high correlation between inside-money and total-money Divisia, their
behavior displayed differently at low frequencies over a long period.
(See frequency of less than 0.1 with period exceeding 10 months.) Total
demand-side money has a high coherency with the main economic
indicators.
In the plots for the broad M4 level aggregates, M4AI denotes the
inside-money Divisia M4 augmented with credit card services. M4A
denotes the total Divisia M4 augmented by credit card services. Figure 2.1 displays the relationship between the total Divisia demandside aggregate and the supply-side inside-money Divisia aggregate.
The first plot displays their power spectrum. The second plot provides
the squared coherency, measuring correlation between the two aggregates at different frequencies. The blue dashed lines above and below
the coherency plot provide the 95 percent confidence band around the
coherency plot. The third plot provides the phase spectrum and its confidence region.
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Figure 2.1 Inside DM4 (supply-side) and Total DM4 (demand-side)

SOURCE: Center for Financial Stability.

Figure 2.2 provides the analogous results relating the broad monetary aggregates to the unemployment rate, while Figure 2.3 provides
the results relating the monetary aggregates to the inflation rate and
Figure 2.4 provides the results relating the aggregates to the CPI level
at different frequencies.
In Figures 2.5–2.8, we similarly consider the Divisia index for the
narrow M1 aggregate. Moving from M4 to the lower levels of aggregation incorporates decreasing amounts of shadow banking and negotiable money-market security liquidity services. The periodic behavior
differences become less significant.
In Figure 2.9, we explore the relationship between unemployment
and inflation and thereby the frequency properties of the Phillips curve.
The cross correlation, ACF (auto-correlation function) in Figure 2.9,
between the unemployment rate and inflation rate is displayed under
different numbers of lag. Since the sampling periodicity is monthly,
the correlation will be significantly positive only when the lag or lead
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Figure 2.2 DM4 and Unemployment Rate

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability.

between the two indicators is more than 12 months. Also, there are
phase differences under different frequencies or periods. As a result,
it is not surprising that Divisia growth rates have different coherences
with these two indicators.

PREVIOUS RESULTS
As this research advances, it will be relevant to compare with prior
results that appeared in Barnett (2012) and Barnett and Chauvet (2011),
but with the newer augmented aggregates now available from the CFS.
Examples from the earlier research include the following figures.
Figure 2.10 displays the broadest Divisia monetary aggregate available from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank over a period of 40 years.
The figure clearly displays the aggregate’s correlation with the business
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Figure 2.3 DM4 and Inflation Rate

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability.

cycle and its predictive ability relative to the Great Recession, which
began immediately after the end of that figure’s time period.
Figure 2.11 displays M1 inside money computed in the conventional manner as total-money supply minus outside money. The M1
aggregate used in that computation is the Federal Reserve Board’s measure using simple sum aggregation without sweep adjustment. The only
available measure of outside money provided by the Federal Reserve
is the monetary base. In that figure, the monetary base was acquired
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED database. Observe
that inside money, by that measure, became negative during a period
of time when most monetary services in the economy were provided
as inside money by privately owned banks and other privately owned
financial intermediaries. The error has two sources: 1) simple-sum M1
is biased downward by the Federal Reserve’s failure to sweep adjust
its component data, and 2) the Federal Reserve’s measure of the mon-
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Figure 2.4 DM4 and CPI

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability.

etary base has become an upwardly biased measure of outside money
in recent years as a result of the Federal Reserve’s nonstandard policies.
Figure 2.12 displays nonborrowed reserves as reported by the
Federal Reserve Board. Nonborrowed reserves were the instrument
of monetary policy adopted by Fed chairman Paul Volcker during the
three-year period of the “monetarist experiment.” Observe the period
during which nonborrowed reserves became negative. That result is a
contradiction in terms, since borrowed reserves, by definition, cannot
exceed total reserves. The Federal Reserve’s accounting error, producing that impossible result, occurs because it is including within borrowed reserves some bank borrowing not held as reserves.
Figure 2.13 displays the results of the Taylor rule, as provided by
the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database. The figure shows the target range
for the Taylor rule and the actual path of the federal funds rate. Clearly
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Figure 2.5 Inside DM1 (supply-side) and Total DM1 (demand-side)

SOURCE: Center for Financial Stability.

the federal funds rate was below the target range for three successive
years, casting doubt on the policy relevance of the interest rate target.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we begin our research on updating the results in
Barnett (2012) to use the more sophisticated Divisia monetary aggregates recently available from the Center for Financial Stability. Those
aggregates are extended to include credit card services and to distinguish demand-side total consumed monetary services from supply-side
inside monetary services associated with value added in banking. Since
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Figure 2.6 DM1 and Unemployment Rate

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability.

the transmission mechanism has lags resulting in different correlations
with final targets in the long run versus the short run, we introduce into
this literature tests in the frequency domain.
To acquire dynamic performances for time series data at different
frequencies, we transform the time series into the frequency domain
using spectral analysis methods. As the sample size becomes larger,
more significant results will become available from data covering a
complete business cycle. Although this approach is an appropriate first
step in this direction, conversion to the frequency domain requires stationarity. However, such stationary data lose much relevant information
about the economy. In subsequent research, we shall investigate nonstationary data with wavelet methodology in the time-frequency domain,
following the approach of Barnett, Ftiti, and Jawadi (2019).

20 Barnett and He
Figure 2.7 DM1 and Inflation Rate

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability.
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Figure 2.8 DM1 and CPI

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability.
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Figure 2.9 Possible Explanation of Phillips Curve

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability.

Figure 2.10 Year-over-Year Growth Rates of the Broadest Available
Divisia Monetary Aggregate during 40 Years

SOURCE: Barnett (2012).
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Figure 2.11 M1 Inside Money, Computed as Federal Reserve Simple
Sum M1 Minus St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Monetary
Base (outside money)

SOURCE: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED Database.

Figure 2.12 Nonborrowed Reserves

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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Figure 2.13 Taylor Rule Federal Funds Rate

SOURCE: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED Database. Reprinted from Barnett
and Chauvet (2011).
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A Closer Look at the Chicago
Fed’s Activity Indexes
Scott A. Brave
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

How does one go about summarizing the state of the U.S. economy? In the age of “big data,” this may seem like a strange question
to ask, but it is no less relevant today than it was when the National
Income and Product Accounts were first developed in the early twentieth century. If anything, it may arguably be a more difficult question
now than it was then, given the multitude of economic statistics produced by both government statistical agencies and private firms. While
it remains common to characterize the health of the U.S. economy in
terms of broad macroeconomic aggregates like gross domestic product
(GDP), other measures are often used as well in order to capture the
state of individual sectors of the economy or as potential indicators of
the future direction of growth in GDP.
With so many indicators available to economic and financial analysts, using them effectively becomes a question of how best to make
use of their common strengths while minimizing their individual weaknesses. Activity indexes are designed for just such a purpose. As an
example of what is referred to as a dense modeling approach in statistics
(Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri 2018), these indexes aim to extract as
much information on the overall state of the U.S. economy as they can,
and to do it as efficiently as possible, while using all of the available
data. In principle, this approach acknowledges that all of the available
indicators might be important for measuring the health of the U.S. economy, despite their own individual influence potentially being small.
At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (the Chicago Fed), we produce two types of activity indexes: 1) economic and 2) financial activity indexes. The former characterize business conditions in the U.S.
economy at various levels of geographic detail, while the latter capture
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credit conditions in the financial sector, broadly considered. Both types
of indexes are predicated on a common statistical framework—namely
the Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) approximate factor model, as
discussed in the next section. While their estimation methods vary, both
types of indexes rely on popular data-dimension reduction techniques
such as principal components and dynamic factor analysis (Stock and
Watson 2011).
As an example of each type of index, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the
recent histories for the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI)
and the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI), respectively.
Based on the work of Stock and Watson (1999), the CFNAI was originally developed to help forecast inflation, but over time it has come
to be viewed as a measure of the U.S. business cycle (Evans, Liu, and
Pham-Kanter 2002). Positive values of the index are interpreted as representing above-trend economic growth; negative values as representing below-trend growth. The index is shown in standard deviation units
based on a history extending back to early 1967. The section titled “The
CFNAI” chronicles the nearly 20-year history of the production of this
index as well as its offshoots and recent extensions.
The NFCI, in contrast, was developed more recently from research
conducted during the global financial crisis. It aims at measuring the
overall tightness of the U.S. financial system (Brave and Butters 2011).
An increase in the NFCI implies an increase in risk or a decrease in
credit growth or leverage in financial markets. Positive (negative) values denote tighter-than-average (looser-than-average) conditions in
standard deviation units based on a history extending back to 1971.
A separate index, the Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index
(ANFCI), which rebenchmarks conditions relative to economic growth
and inflation, is shown in Figure 3.2. The section titled “The NFCI” discusses some of the uses of the NFCI and ANFCI. Concluding remarks
are offered in the final section.

THE APPROXIMATE FACTOR MODEL
The Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) approximate factor model
has come to enjoy widespread use in economics and finance as a method

A Closer Look at the Chicago Fed’s Activity Indexes 27
Figure 3.1 The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI)
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Figure 3.2 The National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)
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to identify a small number of common components (i.e., factors, Ft )
explaining the comovement of large panels of macroeconomic or financial time series, Xit . A commonly used parameterization of this model
is shown in Equation 3.1,
(3.1)

Xit = Γi Ft + ϵit
ϵit ~ N(0,σ 2I ) ,

where Γi are referred to as factor loadings for each time series i, and Eit
represents the idiosyncratic variation in each time series that is uncorrelated with the factors. This framework can be used to capture, for
example, sectors of the economy that vary together over the business
cycle as well as financial markets that tend to tighten in concert over the
financial cycle, with the single most important factor often serving as
an economic or financial activity index, depending on the application.
The challenge faced by practitioners in applying this framework to
construct activity indexes is that the econometrician does not typically
observe the factors. Instead, latent variable estimators that can extract
Ft up to a scale/sign rotation must be applied to Xit . In other words,
one has to extract from the panel of time series the common signal in
Ft from the noise of Eit . It is this feature of these estimators that was
alluded to in the introduction as maximizing the common strengths of
various economic and financial indicators while simultaneously minimizing their individual weaknesses in characterizing the state of the
U.S. economy.
A technique commonly used for this purpose is principal components analysis (PCA). PCA can be viewed as a multidimensional
restricted nonlinear least squares problem (Stock and Watson 2002a),
e.g.,
(3.2) min V (, F ) = (N T )
°,F

−1

N ˜
T
˜
i=1 t=1

(Xit − i Ft )2 s.t.

° 
=1.
N

Solving the error minimization problem above (in matrix form) for a
single common factor produces an estimate of the activity index that is
an intuitive optimally weighted average of large panels of time series.
In other words, the index itself can be represented as a linear combina-
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tion of the economic or financial time series that maximizes their total
variance explained.
ˆ ˜X
N

;
(3.3) Activity Index: F̂ = (˜ )−1 ˜ X ˜
=
N
N
Γ̂ ≡ eigenvector associated with largest eigenvalue of (X′X) .
For large panels of time series, PCA produces consistent estimates of
the factors under general conditions (Bai and Ng 2002), and given its
computational ease, it has become a standard for estimating the approximate factor model.
By extending the analysis of the approximate factor model along
the time dimension, some of the restrictions implied by PCA can be
relaxed using an alternative estimation technique called dynamic factor
analysis. An example is given below:

(3.4)

Xit
Ft
it
t

=
=
˛
˛

i Ft + it ,
–Ft−1 + t ,
N (0, ƒ), Cov(it , jt ) = 0 i =
 j,
N (0, 1),

where we now specify autoregressive dynamics (in companion form)
for a single factor and allow for heteroskedasticity in the idiosyncratic
errors of the panel.
Estimating the activity index in this case requires signal extraction methods for normal-linear state-space models that make use of the
Kalman filter and routines for maximum likelihood estimation (Durbin
and Koopman 2012). While we lose some of the simplicity of interpretation of the activity index by using this method versus PCA, we also
gain the ability to directly forecast anything in the panel of time series.
This feature has proven to be particularly attractive to researchers interested in forecasting the current state of the U.S. economy (Giannone,
Reichlin, and Small 2008). Dynamic factor models can also be easily extended to handle common data irregularities, such as unbalanced
panels and mixed frequencies of observation.1
The treatment of mixed-frequency data sets, in particular, is a
strength of the state-space methods used to estimate dynamic factor
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models. For example, the practice of appending frequency-matching
temporal aggregation constraints to the dynamic factor model (sometimes referred to as accumulators, as in Harvey [1989]) has been used
to construct mixed-frequency indexes of both economic and financial
activity for the United States (e.g., Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti 2009;
Brave and Butters 2012b; Mariano and Murasawa 2003). While these
extensions are not commonly found in standard statistical software
packages, their use is becoming more widespread. For further information, see Brave, Butters, and Kelley (2019), which describes the Matlab
toolbox package MFSS.
Recent research has also developed computationally efficient methods that make the estimation of dynamic factor models feasible for
large panels of time series. These include quasi maximum likelihood
routines such as expectation-maximization (EM) algorithms (Bańbura
and Modugno 2014; Doz, Giannone, and Reichlin 2012) as well as collapsing transformations that can simplify maximum likelihood estimation. An example of the latter can be found in Bräuning and Koopman
(2014). Referred to as collapsed dynamic factor analysis, their application can be viewed as a hybrid case in which principal components
are construed as observations of the latent factors up to the inclusion
of classical measurement errors. The Chicago Fed’s activity indexes
make use of both PCA and dynamic factor estimation methods. In the
sections that follow, we describe these indexes and summarize some of
their applications.

THE CFNAI
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) is a monthly
summary statistic for U.S. economic growth. Estimated by PCA, it is the
first principal component of 85 monthly indicators covering four broad
categories of economic activity: 1) production and income; 2) employment, unemployment, and hours; 3) personal consumption and housing;
and 4) sales, orders, and inventories. Many of the most commonly cited
economic indicators for the United States fall within these categories,
including industrial production, payroll employment, the unemployment
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rate, personal consumption expenditures, housing starts, and manufacturing and trade sales.
First introduced in Evans, Liu, and Pham-Kanter (2002), the CFNAI
derived largely from earlier work examining the forecasting ability of
real economic activity indicators for U.S. inflation (e.g., Fisher 2000;
Stock and Watson 1999). Today, however, it is primarily seen as a
coincident indicator of the U.S. business cycle, as this use of the index
formed much of the motivation for its initial release at the onset of the
2001 recession, as well as much of the subsequent work with the index
during and after the 2007–2009 recession (e.g., Brave 2009; Brave and
Lichtenstein 2012).
The CFNAI’s performance in this regard has been quite good. For
example, the index has been shown to be roughly 95 percent accurate
historically in identifying U.S. recessions from expansions since 1967
based on a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis of U.S.
business cycles (Berge and Jordà 2011). This classification technique
nonparametrically captures the trade-off between type I (false positive)
and type II (false negative) errors based on the observed distribution of
an indicator, Ct. To measure its accuracy for U.S. business cycles, the
ROC curve is constructed over the range of realizations of Ct by applying the Cartesian convention {ROC(r), r}, in which ROC(r) = TP (c)
and r = FP (c) and defining
(3.5)

TP (c) = P [Ct ≥ c|St = 1] ,
FP (c) = P [Ct ≥ c|St = 0] ,

where St is a binary variable, with St = 1 representing a U.S. recession and St = 0 representing an expansion. The area under the curve
(AUC) then represents Ct’s accuracy in separating U.S. recessions from
expansions.
Figure 3.3 depicts AUC values (red connected dots) for the CFNAI
and its three-month moving average (CFNAI-MA3) at leads (negative
x-axis values) and lags (positive x-axis values) in months over the U.S.
business cycle. The dashed red horizontal lines in each panel correspond to the peak AUC value for each measure, while the gray bars are
95 percent confidence intervals. An AUC value statistically significant
from 0.5 reflects an indicator that exhibits a significant ability to appro-
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Figure 3.3 AUCs at Monthly Leads and Lags of the Business Cycle
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priately classify recessions and expansions as defined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).2 The closer an AUC value is to
1, the more accurate the indicator. The closer an indicator’s peak AUC
value is to a zero monthly lag, the more coincident it is with the cycle,
so that a peak value to the left of zero signifies a leading indicator and
a peak value to the right of zero signifies a lagging indicator. It is clear
from Figure 3.3 that both the CFNAI and CFNAI-MA3 are highly accurate coincident indicators of the U.S. business cycle, with peak AUCs
of between 0.93 and 0.96 in the range of zero to one monthly lags. This
result has also been borne out in practice, as the CFNAI led the NBER’s
dating of the 2001 and 2007–2009 recessions by 6–18 months on average in real time, according to the rules of thumb for the index used to
judge the beginning and end of recessions (Brave and Butters 2010). Its
success as a business-cycle measure has also led to its use in various
forecasting applications for U.S. real GDP growth (Brave and Butters
2014), as well as the estimation of its trend (Brave and Butters 2013).
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More recent work has expanded on the CFNAI by broadening the
universe of data series and incorporating the latest advances in dynamicfactor analytic methods. For instance, Brave, Butters, and Kelley (2019)
use mixed-frequency collapsed dynamic-factor analysis to summarize growth in 500 monthly real activity indicators and quarterly GDP
growth to arrive at a measure of monthly GDP growth for the United
States that can be decomposed into trend, cycle, and irregular components. The cycle component is then shown to be 99 percent accurate
in capturing U.S. recessions and expansions and can be broken down
further into leading and lagging elements that resemble the CFNAI and
the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Index, respectively.
The impressive résumé of the CFNAI has also spurred the development of other indexes used to measure growth in economic activity at
a regional level (e.g., the Midwest Economy Index, or MEI; see Brave
and Lu [2010]) and a local level (e.g., the Detroit Economic Activity
Index, or DEAI; see Brave and Traub [2017]).3 These indexes have
been shown to be useful in filling gaps in our understanding of local
economic conditions, given the longer publication delays and limited
availability of data at state and local levels. For example, Brave and
Wang (2011) used the MEI to predict gross state product growth in real
time, and the DEAI was developed in order to measure the economic
progress of Detroit after exiting bankruptcy. Summarizing annual,
quarterly, and monthly data on city income, labor, real estate, and trade
using mixed-frequency dynamic factor methods, the DEAI can also be
used to estimate GDP for the city of Detroit as well as forecast its per
capita income.

THE NFCI
The approximate factor model can also be applied to financial time
series in order to capture periods of financial stress consistent with a
financial cycle. Working with financial data, however, introduces additional complexities. For instance, financial time series are generally
available at mixed and often higher frequencies of observation. Also,
they tend to have richer correlation structures in which not all comovement can be captured in a single direction; i.e., there is generally a
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broader mix of procyclical and countercyclical indicators. Furthermore,
if one is interested in isolating the state of financial markets from the
state of the business cycle, adjustments must be made to either the data
or the model to condition on this information.
All of these concerns are addressed in one form or another in the
construction of the Chicago Fed’s National Financial Conditions Index
(NFCI). The NFCI is a weekly summary statistic for U.S. financial conditions and is estimated by mixed-frequency dynamic-factor analysis
on a panel of 105 weekly, monthly, and quarterly financial time series.
The index is representative of the entire U.S. financial system, containing broad coverage of money and debt and equity markets, as well as
the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. It has been shown to
be a useful tool in monitoring financial stability, aligning closely with
historical episodes of financial stress (e.g., Brave and Butters 2011,
2012b).
By conditioning the NFCI data on the state of the business cycle, a
leading signal for financial stress can sometimes also be obtained (Brave
and Butters 2011). This can be seen in Figure 3.2, which depicts the
full-time series of the NFCI and its adjusted counterpart, the ANFCI.
The ANFCI rebenchmarks U.S. financial conditions around a historical
mean that is typical for a given level of economic growth and inflation (Brave and Kelley 2017). Positive (negative) values then denote
tighter-than-average (looser-than-average) conditions on this basis. The
ANFCI tends to display a slight lead on the NFCI in the run-up and
aftermath of periods of financial stress. In addition, Brave and Genay
(2011) find that it was also a useful predictor of Federal Reserve policy
actions taken during the global financial crisis.
The indicators underlying the NFCI can be broadly classified into
three types: 1) risk, 2) credit, and 3) leverage. These classifications
are used in Brave and Butters (2012b) to construct subindexes of the
NFCI (labeled risk, credit, and leverage) and highlight features of the
financial cycle. Risk indicators capture volatility and funding risk in the
financial sector and tend to be coincident indicators of financial stress.
Credit indicators describe credit conditions in the nonfinancial sector
and tend to be lagging indicators of financial stress. Finally, leverage
indicators are measures of debt and equity in both sectors and tend to
be leading indicators of financial stress.
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In order to demonstrate these features, Figure 3.4 repeats the ROC
analysis technique from the previous section on the three NFCI subindexes. For the subindexes, we classify the financial cycle based on
a realization of the overall NFCI being positive or negative. Here, the
x-axis values of the panels of the figure correspond to weekly leads or
lags, while the y-axes continue to display AUC values. From the figure, it is clear that the risk subindex is a highly coincident indicator of
financial stress (i.e., weeks where NFCI > 0), with a peak AUC value of
0.99 at a zero-week lag. On the other hand, the credit subindex tends to
lag behind periods of stress by about a month, with a lower peak AUC
value of 0.83, and the leverage subindex tends to lead periods of stress
by about three months, with a lower peak AUC value of 0.78.
The leading signal for financial stress provided by leverage indicators can be further enhanced by isolating a subset of indicators for nonfinancial businesses and households. The resulting nonfinancial leverage
Figure 3.4 AUCs at Weekly Leads and Lags of the Financial Cycle
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subindex tends to lead periods of stress by almost nine months, with a
peak AUC value of 0.73, as seen in the bottom right panel of Figure 3.4.
Brave and Butters (2012a) show that this particular subindex can be a
useful early warning indicator, as it displays a significant lead with both
the business and financial cycles and offers a superior view of potential
financial imbalances in firm and household balance sheets in comparison with alternative measures like the private credit-to-GDP ratio. In
addition, Brave and Lopez (2019) use this subindex to construct a probability of financial instability for the United States and then show how
it can be used as a guidepost for macroprudential policymakers.

CONCLUSION
While it was not a point of focus in this chapter, it is worth mentioning that the activity index methodology can also be applied to qualitative, or survey-based, data just as easily as the quantitative government or market-based data focused on here. For example, Brave and
Walstrum (2014) and Brave, Walstrum, and Berman (2015) develop
an activity index methodology for quantifying survey responses collected for the Chicago Fed’s Beige Book contribution. This work led
to the introduction of the Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions
(CFSBC).4 Walstrum (2017) then showed how the CFSBC Activity
Index could be used to forecast current-quarter GDP growth, much as
with traditional activity indexes.
It is also worth noting that the development of activity indexes continues to be an active and expanding area of research, with the work
of the Chicago Fed only a small part of that process. Within the Federal Reserve system, a number of indexes related to ours are also published, including various financial stress indexes and national and local
business-conditions indexes.5 Many foreign central banks and governmental agencies also produce similar indexes to ours in order to better understand fluctuations in their parts of the world. The success of
these measures in capturing business and financial cycles and in aiding
forecasting continues to demonstrate their value to policymakers and
private-sector analysts.
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Notes
Prepared for the 2018−2019 Werner Sichel Lecture Series at Western Michigan University. The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent those
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System. I would like to
thank Dr. C. James Hueng and the WMU faculty and students for their hospitality; and
the team of economists, research analysts, and assistants, as well as the editorial and
public affairs staff, who support the production of these indexes at the Chicago Fed.
For more information on the Chicago Fed’s economic and financial activity indexes,
please go to chicagofed.org/research/data/index. To sign up for email notifications of
any Chicago Fed index release, go to chicagofed.org/utilities/subscribe.
1. PCA can also be extended to handle some of these issues. See, for example, the
alterations described in Stock and Watson (2002b).
2. As defined above, AUC values greater than 0.5 are consistent with a procyclical
measure, and values less than 0.5 are consistent with a countercyclical measure.
Wherever necessary, I have applied the convention of multiplying the indicator by
1 in order to assure that only AUC values greater than or equal to 0.5 are plotted.
Without this sign convention, one would arrive at the overall accuracy of a countercyclical indicator by taking 1 minus its AUC value.
3. For more information on the MEI and DEAI, go to www.chicagofed.org/mei and
www.chicagofed.org/deai.
4. For more information on the CFSBC, go to www.chicagofed.org/cfsbc.
5. See, for example, the metro business cycle indexes described in Arias, Gascon,
and Rapach (2016) and maintained by the St. Louis Fed.
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Economists at policy institutions, trading desks, and media outlets
rely on economic data produced by various statistical agencies to understand the state of the economy and predict its future path. However, the
highest-quality and most comprehensive economic data are published
with long delays after the periods to which they refer. Most notably,
gross domestic product (GDP), the most comprehensive measure of
U.S. economic activity, is first published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) one month after the end of each reference quarter, and
these initial estimates are later revised.
Faced with the challenging task of monitoring macroeconomic
conditions in real time, analysts track a wide variety of data releases,
distilling signal from noise in incoming data and revising their beliefs
about the state of the economy when these data diverge significantly
from their expectations. The Nowcasting Report of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (the New York Fed Staff Nowcast) formalizes and
automates this process through an econometric model–based approach.
The platform produces nowcasts of economic activity—predictions for
the present, recent past, and near future—which are continually updated
as new data become available. The platform’s nowcasts of real GDP
growth can be computed before the start of the reference quarter and
updated each day to incorporate the most recent information, providing
useful real-time readings on the state of the economy that can be used
to guide key policy and private-sector decisions.
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In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the general challenge
of monitoring macroeconomic conditions in real time and the methods
underlying the New York Fed Staff Nowcast. We then present two case
studies that assess the ability of the New York Fed Staff Nowcast to
provide accurate early estimates of GDP during important real-world
situations.
First, we study the day-by-day movements in the GDP growth nowcast during two critical quarters of the 2007–2009 recession. The model
is able to predict major swings in economic activity (both upward
and downward) long before the publication of the first official GDP
estimates, providing confidence in its ability to track business cycle
fluctuations.
Second, motivated by extensive data publication delays resulting
from the 2018–2019 partial shutdown of the U.S. federal government,
we conduct a counterfactual exercise to evaluate the performance of the
nowcast during periods of severe yet realistic disruptions to the standard flow of macroeconomic data. Even during such periods, the nowcast can predict GDP growth with an accuracy comparable to the BEA’s
first official estimate; in particular, it can serve as a useful substitute for
the official estimate if it is not published according to schedule (as was
the case in early 2019).

THE REAL-TIME DATA FLOW
As mentioned, in order to understand the state of the economy in
real time, economists must extract signal from noise in a broad set of
economic data. At any given point in time, economists face a trade-off
between timeliness and quality when evaluating the most recent available data for each indicator. Business and consumer sentiment indicators—often referred to by market commentators as soft data—provide
the first readings on economic activity during a particular reference
period. Labor market indicators typically arrive next; most notably, the
widely followed Employment Situation Report, released by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), provides estimates of the unemployment rate
and payroll employment shortly after the end of the month to which
the new data refer. Hard data on production, sales, and income begin
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to arrive several weeks later. Finally, the first estimate of gross domestic product—the total value of all goods and services produced in the
United States over a given quarter—is published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) roughly one month after the end of the reference
quarter. Data of the highest quality and broadest coverage are thus only
available well after the end of the period to which they refer.
The trade-off between timeliness and accuracy is present not only
across different economic indicators, but also across different releases
for the same indicator. In the case of GDP, the BEA produces benchmark estimates every five years that rely on data collected through a
comprehensive economic census, covering around seven million businesses with paid employees and over 95 percent of the expenditures
included in GDP. Between these benchmark estimates, annual and quarterly estimates are constructed using surveys conducted by the Census
Bureau—with 150,000 and 35,000 reporting units, respectively—as
well as administrative data (such as those from the Internal Revenue
Service) and estimates from other sources (such as BLS employment
data). In short, these benchmark revisions are the product of careful aggregation of detailed microeconomic information into national
accounts. In contrast, the “advance” GDP release is the first official
estimate available, with only a one-month delay. It is constructed using
only half of the hard expenditure data ultimately used in the benchmark revisions and relies heavily on survey data gleaned by the Census
Bureau. As a result of these unavoidable shortcuts required to produce
timely estimates, these first estimates of GDP are subject to sizable revisions as higher-quality source data become available. What is gained
through detailed microeconomic information is lost in timeliness.
With new data being released almost every day, and each release
providing estimates for a large number of variables over a single reference period, economists face a big-data problem when attempting to
monitor economic conditions. As an illustration, Figure 4.1 provides a
useful visualization of the data at our disposal. The three-dimensional
surface plot displays the path of 37 major economic indicators since
1985, with each data series colored according to its category.1 The heat
map on the horizontal plane presents a two-dimensional visualization
of the same data: brighter yellow values indicate realizations above the
sample mean for a given series, while darker red values indicate realizations well below the mean. The dark red areas are especially preva-
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Figure 4.1 Big Data in Macroeconomics
Housing and construction
Manufacturing

Surveys
Retail and consumption

Income
Labor

International trade
Others

Data series

NOTE: The three-dimensional surface plot displays the standardized time series for the
major economic indicators since 1985, which are shaded by category as indicated in
the legend. Recessions are marked by transparent gray surfaces. The heat map on the
horizontal plane shows positive and negative readings of the data.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics and
the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED).

lent across many series during the recessions of the early 1990s, early
2000s, and (most notably) 2008 through 2009. In these periods, broad
red strips across the heat map highlight the common downward movement across many series. However, despite the stark common movements across these series during both recessions and expansions, at any
given point in time there are also individual series whose movements
deviate from the others.
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NOWCASTING
Nowcasting refers to the process of monitoring economic conditions by forming predictions for economic activity in the present, recent
past, and near future. Nowcasting is a big-data problem, given the vast
array of macroeconomic data at our disposal. The New York Fed Nowcast summarizes the rich and complex dataset depicted in Figure 4.1
using a parsimonious model motivated by the strong comovements evident among the series. The model formalizes the notion of a common
business-cycle component present across all of these series and allows
one to distill signal from noise by filtering out fluctuations specific to
individual variables from incoming data.
The New York Fed Staff Nowcast is based upon a dynamic-factor
model, which solves the “large n, small T” problem of relatively few
time observations T compared to the large number of available data
series n. It does this through dimension reduction: a small number of
unobserved common factors are used to summarize the bulk of fluctuations in the observed variables. Forni et al. (2000) and Stock and Watson
(2002a,b) presented the first applications of dynamic-factor models to
large macroeconomic data sets, while Giannone, Reichlin, and Small
(2008) demonstrate that these models can be used to reliably predict
GDP growth in real time. Over the past decade, nowcasting models
have been developed for many countries (see Bańbura et al. [2013]
and Bok et al. [2018] for a survey).The dynamic-factor model can
be easily cast in state space form, allowing for efficient estimation of
both unknown parameters and unobserved common factors using the
Kalman filter (Bańbura and Modugno 2014; Doz, Giannone, and
Reichlin 2011). Moreover, the process by which the model’s GDP
growth forecasts are updated upon the release of new data can be interpreted in an intuitive manner that mimics market participants’ processing of information. Before each data release, a new value is predicted
for each variable based on previously available information. Once the
new data are released, the model updates its forecast for GDP growth
based on the discrepancy between predicted and realized values of all
the variables; we refer to this discrepancy as news. If the model’s predictions for each variable are exactly correct, its GDP growth forecast will
remain unchanged, just as market participants would not revise their
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beliefs about the state of the economy in the absence of news. On the
other hand, if the model’s predictions are not exactly correct, its GDP
growth forecast will be revised to account for the news, just as market
participants who observe stronger- or weaker-than-expected data would
revise their beliefs about the state of the economy accordingly.
More formally, revisions to the model’s GDP growth forecasts are
simply a weighted sum of news across all data releases. The sign of these
weights encodes whether a higher-than-expected value for each release
represents “good” or “bad” news (e.g., payroll employment versus the
unemployment rate). The magnitude of the weights encodes the overall
information content that the news provides on economic conditions in
a particular period, taking into account factors like timeliness and the
extent to which each variable is driven by common versus idiosyncratic
fluctuations. The model is thus able to determine which data releases
are most important for monitoring current economic conditions, just as
market participants place greater emphasis on some data releases than
others (as evidenced by sharp asset price movements typical upon the
release of closely followed indicators like GDP).
The New York Fed Nowcast therefore provides a platform for interpreting the flow of data in real time. By determining each new observation’s impact on predicted GDP growth, the model provides a “common unit” for comparing news across series like payroll employment
and the unemployment rate. Additionally, the GDP growth forecasts
are updated in a fully automated and judgment-free manner, allowing
for continuous updates as soon as new information becomes available.
And, these forecasts are available well before the publication of the
first official estimate, which occurs one month after the end of each
reference quarter. A detailed description of the model and the data is
provided in Bok et al. (2018).

REAL-TIME ESTIMATES: TWO CASE STUDIES
We now present two case studies that illustrate the real-time performance of the New York Fed Staff Nowcast in two scenarios in which
early and accurate GDP estimates serve a particularly important role in
both policy and private-sector decision making. For both of these case
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studies, we make use of a daily real-time database that tracks the exact
data available for each of the model’s 37 input series on each date from
October 1, 2001, to the present. By using real-time data to recursively
estimate the model’s parameters at the start of each quarter and update
the GDP growth estimates using the new data available on each date,
we are able to exactly reconstruct the estimates that forecasters would
have obtained using our model in the past. Complete archives of both
the reconstructed and real-time New York Fed Staff Nowcast estimates
are available to the public and are described in Adams, Giannone, et al.
(2019).2
Nowcasting the Great Recession
In our first case study, we track the day-by-day movements in the
nowcast for GDP growth during two critical quarters of the 2007–2009
recession. The fourth quarter of 2008 saw the sharpest decline in real
economic activity, while the third quarter of 2009 marked the end of
the recession and the beginning of the recovery. For both quarters, we
chart the progression of the GDP growth nowcast (represented by black
diamonds), starting one month before the start of the quarter and ending one month after the end of the quarter after the BEA publishes the
first official GDP estimate. Colored bars denote the overall contributions of data releases from different categories—surveys, retail and
consumption, and more—to the weekly changes in the nowcast, based
on the decompositions described in the second section. For comparison
against official estimates, we also plot both the BEA’s first and latest
estimates for each quarter.3
The fourth quarter of 2008 was the worst of the recession, with real
GDP contracting by 8.4 percent. On September 12, 2008 (right before
the failure of Lehman Brothers was announced on September 15), our
forecast for GDP growth for the fourth quarter of 2008 actually stood at
a promising 3.1 percent. This estimate quickly changed as data on business sentiment, industrial production, and retail sales for the month of
September became available, and our nowcast first dropped into negative territory roughly one month after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy
on October 17. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Recession Dating Committee officially announced on December 1,
2008, that the economy had been in recession for the past 12 months.
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On the previous Friday, our nowcast for GDP growth in 2008:Q4 was
−1.5 percent (Figure 4.2). Additional negative data releases over the
next two months led to further declines in our nowcast, until our final
prediction sank to −3.6 percent immediately before the advance GDP
release in January 2009. Although we predicted the BEA’s advance estimate almost exactly, this first estimate understated the severity of the
contraction and was later revised downward substantially.
The third quarter of 2009 marked the end of the recession, as determined by the NBER Recession Dating Committee one year later. At
the start of the quarter in July, our nowcast still predicted slightly negative GDP growth. However, over the next few months, a wide variety
Figure 4.2 Nowcasting the Great Recession in 2008:Q4

NOTE: Colored bars reflect the impact of each data release on the nowcast.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics.
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of better-than-expected data was released (especially for manufacturing, international trade, and business sentiment), and our nowcast for
2009:Q3 GDP growth (Figure 4.3) rose to over 5 percent by the end of
the quarter. Our model successfully predicted the timing of the recovery but turned out to be overly optimistic in predicting its strength: the
advance estimate of GDP growth in 2009:Q3 was 3.5 percent, but this
estimate was later revised downward, as the latest available estimate
reported growth of only 1.5 percent.
For both of these important quarters, the nowcast provided an early
and reliable signal of the direction in which growth was headed, months
before the publication of the first official estimate. These results provide
Figure 4.3 Nowcasting the Recovery in 2009:Q3

NOTE: Colored bars reflect the impact of each data release on the nowcast.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics.
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confidence that the New York Fed Staff Nowcast can provide useful
early readings on upward and downward swings in activity by filtering
through a variety of incoming data ahead of the publication of official
GDP estimates. The large revisions from the first to the latest published
estimates show that producing estimates with both minimal delay and
high precision is a challenge even for the BEA. The contribution of the
New York Fed Staff Nowcast is to extend the “accuracy timeliness”
frontier in the period before official statistics are available.
Nowcasting with Scarce Data
In our second case study, we evaluate the performance of the nowcast during periods of severe yet realistic disruptions to the standard flow
of macroeconomic data. This exercise is motivated by the 2018−2019
U.S. federal government partial shutdown, during which the temporary
closure of the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis
delayed the publication of many scheduled data releases. While the
most notable delayed release was the first estimate of 2018:Q4 GDP
(which was postponed by one month), many other widely followed
indicators of economic activity were released with substantial delays,
including retail sales, home sales and construction, imports and exports,
and durable goods orders.4 However, a variety of other data sources—
both hard data directly measuring activity and soft data measuring business sentiment—were published as previously scheduled.
Do such disruptions to the regular data publication schedule impair
the ability of the New York Fed Staff Nowcast to accurately predict
GDP growth? To answer this question, we conduct a counterfactual
exercise in which we simulate similar dataflow disruptions for each
quarter from 2002:Q1 to 2017:Q4, as if the Census Bureau and BEA
had ceased publication of all new data releases starting one week before
the end of the quarter. We assume that data previously published by
these agencies remain available, and that new data published by other
government agencies and private organizations become available as
they are released in real time. We then evaluate the performance of our
nowcasting model in this “scarce data” setting by studying the empirical distribution of its forecast errors for GDP growth, which provides a
complete description of its historical forecasting performance.
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Figure 4.4 plots GDP growth forecast errors for all quarters in our
evaluation sample, based on the number of weeks remaining until the
first GDP release at the date of each forecast (listed across the horizontal axis). The black dots represent the historical forecast errors for
our nowcasting model (using the actual data available in real time),
Figure 4.4 Similar Data Delays Would Not Have Drastically Changed
Past Predictions

NOTE: Points represent quarterly GDP growth forecast errors (for Nowcast-Actual and
Shutdown) and revision errors (for the Bureau of Economic Analysis first release),
computed with respect to the latest available estimates for the years 2002 through
2017. Shaded bands depict the 16th and 84th percentiles of the historical forecast
errors, while the red lines at week 0 depict the same percentiles for revisions to the
first release.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics.
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computed using the latest available GDP growth estimates.5 The gold
diamonds represent our model’s forecast errors under the counterfactual scenario when key data releases are delayed, starting roughly four
weeks before the first GDP release. The red triangles represent revision
errors, from the first estimate published by the BEA for each quarter
to the latest available estimates. Shaded bands depict the 16th to 84th
percentile range of the errors for each forecast, while the red line on the
week of the first GDP release depicts the same range for revision errors
from the BEA’s first to latest releases; these ranges provide an assessment of uncertainty for each of the three forecasts.
Overall, the model’s forecasts for GDP growth remain accurate
even when there are substantial disruptions to the usual pattern of data
availability. For the weeks leading up to the first GDP release, the historical forecast error distributions represented by the black and gold
markers are broadly similar, indicating that the accuracy of the nowcast
is mostly unchanged when new Census Bureau and BEA data releases
are not published. Moreover, under these conditions, the gold uncertainty bands reported for the nowcast are similar in width to the red bar
at the week of the first GDP release, depicting uncertainty around this
estimate. Therefore, the finding of Bok et al. (2018)—that uncertainty
is similar around both the final nowcasts for a given quarter and the first
GDP release—still holds, even when important data are not released
according to their usual schedule, as was the case during the 2018–2019
federal government shutdown. Moreover, if the first release of GDP
also happens to be delayed during these periods, the nowcast provides
an alternative estimate of GDP growth of comparable accuracy to the
first release.
Figure 4.5 presents an alternative visualization of the forecast error
distributions for the nowcast (both the actual historical forecast errors
and the errors under our counterfactual scenario based on the government shutdown) and first official GDP release. The left panel depicts
the smoothed empirical distribution of the three sets of forecast errors
plotted along the vertical line at the week of the first GDP release from
the previous figure. The right panel depicts the distribution of forecast
errors for current-quarter projections at the time of the previous quarter’s first GDP release—e.g., the projections for 2019:Q1 GDP growth
made near the end of January 2019.
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Figure 4.5 Nowcast with Delayed Data Similarly Accurate to BEA First
Release

NOTE: The figures report kernel-smoother estimates of forecast error densities as of
the scheduled first GDP release (week of February 1, 2019). The left panel gives error
distributions for the previous quarter (2018:Q4). The right panel gives error distributions for 2019:Q1. Black lines refer to the actual nowcast errors, gold dashed lines
refer to nowcast shutdown errors, and red dotted lines refer to the BEA revision errors.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics.

As noted in the discussion of the previous figure, the three forecast
error distributions are broadly similar, indicating that the nowcast provides estimates of GDP growth with comparable accuracy to the first
official release, even under conditions of data scarcity similar to those
resulting from the 2018–2019 U.S. federal government shutdown. The
main differences between these distributions arise from large negative
forecast errors, which are more likely to occur for the nowcast than for
the BEA estimates. Moving to the right panel, both distributions for the
model’s longer-horizon forecast errors display greater dispersion than
their shorter-horizon counterparts in the left panel, reflecting greater
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uncertainty when making predictions for the current (as opposed to
the previous) quarter. The striking similarity of the model’s actual and
counterfactual forecast errors reported in the right panel illustrates that
data scarcity, similar to the scarcity of data resulting from the 2018–
2019 U.S. federal government shutdown, does not blunt the accuracy of
early projections for the current quarter.
Finally, Figure 4.6 displays the real-time progression of the GDP
growth nowcast for 2018:Q4. The effects of the shutdown-related data
publication delays can be seen through the paucity of colorful bars from
late December through early January. While our model’s prediction was
quite close to the first official estimate released in February 2019, the
Figure 4.6 Nowcasting during the Government Shutdown

NOTE: Colored bars reflect the impact of each data release on the nowcast.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics.
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latest available estimate is notably lower than both of these early estimates, highlighting the uncertainty about economic activity that prevails even after official statistics are initially published.

CONCLUSION
The New York Fed Staff Nowcast is able to produce accurate and
early estimates of real GDP growth well before the publication of the
BEA’s first official estimates. We presented two case studies that evaluate the model’s performance during the Great Recession and during
the U.S. federal government shutdown at the beginning of 2019. We
encourage interested readers to further study our model by exploring
our online interactive archives, which collect both real-time forecasts
for the period from 2016:Q1 to the present and reconstructed historical
forecasts extending back to 2002:Q1.6

Notes
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve
System, or the Upjohn Institute.
1. The full list of all 37 series is presented in Bok et al. (2018). Each series is appropriately transformed in order to induce stationarity, then standardized so that all
variables have the same mean and variance over the sample period.
2. These archives can be explored in interactive form at the following link: https://
www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/nowcast.
3. The latest available estimates are based on data published by the BEA in July
2019.
4. For a full list of data releases delayed because of the shutdown, see Adams, Qian,
et al. (2019).
5. We use the latest available estimates, since these reflect both 1) new source data
that become available after the publication of the first estimate and 2) methodological changes intended to improve the quality of the estimates.
6. These archives (along with structured data files containing historical forecasts)
can be found at the following link: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/
nowcast.
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Real-Time Measurement
of Business Conditions,
Macroeconomic Surprises,
and Uncertainty
Is a Recession Looming?
Alessandro Barbarino
Chiara Scotti
Federal Reserve Board

As pointed out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2019), the
current economic expansion has lasted more than nine years, becoming one of the longest expansions since 1945.1 Because of such a long
boom, some people think that a recession might be due soon. In January
2019, for example, the Wall Street Journal published a survey showing
a 25 percent probability of recession in the next year, the highest level
since October 2011 and twice the probability of one year ago. Similarly,
the Blue Chip Indicators for January 2019 reported a consensus survey
result for the probability of a recession in 2019 at 25 percent and the
probability of a recession in 2020 at 37 percent. Reportedly, one of the
reasons the Dow 30 and S&P 500 indexes both fell by more than 15
percent in December 2018 was from a concern that the economy would
fall into a recession in late 2019 or 2020, prompting negative earnings
growth.
This chapter focuses first on evaluating current business conditions
in the United States, based on real-activity economic indicators, as well
as on gauging market participants’ optimism or pessimism about the
economy and the uncertainty around this evaluation. Second, it evaluates some recession probability models that make use of a variety of
data to pinpoint whether indeed a recession is looming.
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To evaluate business conditions, we look at the Aruoba, Diebold,
and Scotti (2009) business condition index (henceforth, “ADS index”)
as well as the Scotti (2016) surprise and uncertainty indexes updated
with the most current data. The ADS index turned negative in early
2019, suggesting worse-than-average conditions for the U.S. economy
over the preceding months.2 Economic surprises and uncertainty are
evaluated using the Scotti (2016) indexes. The surprise index spiked
early in 2019, as market participants were more pessimistic than warranted by economic releases, but then sharply collapsed following the
release of the February employment report in early March. The uncertainty index steadily increased at the beginning of 2019, reaching levels
last seen in late 2017.
Given this assessment, should we conclude that a recession is looming, as suggested by the CBO analysis? In order to tackle this question, we review the prediction of extant recession forecasting models
by feeding them a variety of data, including the real-time indicators
discussed in the first part of this chapter, a larger set of individual macro
variables, and financial variables (like level, slope, curvature, corporate
spreads, and so forth). When using individual data, to make sure we
have entries for all the variables until the last data point, we truncate
the sample in December 2018 (even if for some data series we have
data until the day before we ran the estimation in March 2019) and find
an increased probability of recession in mid-2019, possibly due to the
big correction observed in financial markets in late 2018. When we reestimate the recession probabilities employing only the ADS index as a
summary statistic of the real indicators, which is available in real time
and allows us to take care of the ragged edges of the data, the estimated
probabilities significantly decrease. Our analysis also shows that, consistent with Berge (2015), real variables appear to be more powerful
in signaling recessions at shorter horizons, while the term spread and
some additional financial variables are valuable leading indicators at
longer horizons—that is, at horizons of 6–12 months ahead and beyond.
The remainder of the chapter discusses the real-time measurement
of business conditions in the next section, the real-time evaluation of
optimism/pessimism and uncertainty about the state of the economy in
the section after that, and the evaluation of recession probability models
with a variety of data in the fourth section. The final section offers our
conclusions.
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REAL-TIME MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009) state the following:
Aggregate business conditions are of central importance in the
business, finance, and policy communities, worldwide, and huge
resources are devoted to the assessment of the continuously evolving state of the real economy. Literally thousands of newspapers,
newsletters, television shows, and blogs, not to mention armies of
employees in manufacturing and service industries, including the
financial services industries, central banks, government and nongovernment organizations, grapple constantly with the measurement and forecasting of evolving business conditions.

Complications to this assessment include the fact that business conditions are latent, data are released at different times and therefore not
always all available at the time of the evaluation, and they are at different frequencies. The latency of the business cycle means that the business cycle is not directly observed, as it is not represented by any single
variable, but rather, it is derived by information contained in a number
of indicators like gross domestic product (GDP), industrial production
(IP), employment, and so on. In fact, the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) does not define a recession in terms of only one indicator of activity, such as two consecutive quarters of decline in real
GDP, but as a significant decline in economic activity spread across the
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP,
real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail
sales.3
Data are released at different times. For example, nonfarm payroll
is announced the first Friday of the month, and initial jobless claims
are released weekly on Thursday. Assume that it is Tuesday, February
26, 2019, and we are trying to assess the current state of the economy
for the first quarter of 2019. We only have partial information available
relative to that quarter. The January nonfarm payroll is available, but
the February job market report will not be available until the coming
Friday. Likewise, as of February 26, initial jobless claims releases are
available only for the first seven weeks of the year. In addition, GDP
data relative to the first quarter will be released only a quarter later.
This ragged-edge structure of the data complicates the evaluation of
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real-time business conditions, as we need to juggle data series of different lengths.
In addition, data have different frequencies, covering various units
of time. For example, GDP is quarterly, nonfarm payroll is monthly, and
initial jobless claim is weekly. An assessment of business conditions
needs to take this into account and be able to accommodate the different units and the aggregation that makes weekly series comparable to
monthly or quarterly variables.
The empirical business cycle literature has dealt with these features through alternative approaches, including the dynamic factor
framework, whether from the “small data” perspective, as in Aruoba,
Diebold, and Scotti (2009); Chauvet (1998); Diebold and Rudebusch
(1996); and Stock and Watson (1989), or the “big data” perspective, as
in the seminal work of Bai and Ng (2006); Forni et al. (2000); and Stock
and Watson (1991, 2002). Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009) propose
a framework to measure economic activity in real time using a dynamic
factor model that combines a small set of time series at different frequencies. In particular, the ADS index is designed to track real business
conditions at a high frequency, combining information from (seasonally
adjusted) economic indicators: weekly initial jobless claims, monthly
payroll employment, monthly industrial production, monthly personal
income less transfer payments, monthly manufacturing and trade sales,
and quarterly real GDP. The Philadelphia Fed updates the index as soon
as new data releases become available. Figure 5.1 displays the ADS
index as of March 15, 2019. Of note, the average value of the index is
zero, with progressively bigger positive values indicating progressively
better-than-average conditions, and progressively more negative values
indicating progressively worse-than-average conditions. The business
condition index in Figure 5.1 is based on the information available as of
March 2019. The index might look different, though, when computed
on different data vintages. Figure 5.2, for example, shows the ADS
index computed in real time in March 2019 and contrasts it against the
index computed on different data vintages ranging from 11 to 2 years
prior to March 2019. The ADS index computed on the December 2008
data vintage ends in December 2008 and, likewise, lines for the indexes
computed on data vintages in 2009, 2014, 2017, and 2019 end in the
respective years. Looking at the last recession, the real-time estimate
of the index turned out to be overly optimistic, and it was subsequently
revised downward, as shown by the wedge between the 2008 vintage (in
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Business conditions

Figure 5.1 Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) Business Condition Index,
3/1/1960–3/15/2019

NOTE: The ADS is constructed using the latest data available as of March 15, 2019.
Grey shading indicates NBER-designated recessions. The limits used on the y-axis
reflect the minimum and maximum values of the index over the entire history.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, ADS Business Conditions Index.

Business conditions

Figure 5.2 ADS Index in Real Time

NOTE: The ADS indexes are constructed using data available up to the date indicated
in the legend.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, ADS Business Conditions Index.
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blue) and the March 2019 vintage (the black line). Focusing on recent
years, Figure 5.3 shows the tentacle plot of the 10 vintages of data prior
to March 2019. After a couple of positive estimates at the beginning of
the year, the ADS index was subsequently revised downward into negative territory relative to estimates computed on earlier data vintages.
Both the new data releases and the revisions of previous data explain
the downward revision.

REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM
AND UNCERTAINTY
While the ADS index measures the state of the economy and serves
as a summary statistic of the information that market participants have
received thus far about real activity, it is silent with respect to whether
this information is in line with what market participants are expect-

Business conditions

Figure 5.3 ADS Index in Real Time, Recent Vintages

NOTE: The ADS indexes are constructed using data available up to the date indicated
in the legend.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, ADS Business Conditions Index.
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ing and the uncertainty surrounding the data releases. The surprise and
uncertainty indexes in Scotti (2016) speak to these issues. The surprise
index summarizes recent economic data surprises and measures deviations from consensus expectations. A positive (negative) reading of the
index indicates that agents were more pessimistic (optimistic), expecting economic data to be worse (better) than their actual realization. The
uncertainty index measures the uncertainty related to the state of the
economy. A greater (smaller) reading suggests that agents have, on balance, been more (less) uncertain about business conditions.
Figure 5.4 displays the surprise index computed as of March 2019.
The surprise index reached its lowest value during the global financial
crisis of 2008–2009, suggesting that as the crisis was unfolding, agents
were less pessimistic about its possible outcome and its impact on the
real economy. In contrast, the index turned positive during the beginning of 2019, indicating that agents were pessimistic about the state of
the economy, harboring fairly low expectations relative to the actual

Surprise index

Figure 5.4 Scotti Surprise Index

NOTE: The Scotti (2016) Surprise Index summarizes recent economic data surprises
and measures deviations from consensus expectations. A positive (negative) reading
of the surprise index indicates that agents were more pessimistic (optimistic), expecting economic data to be better (worse) than their actual realization.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Bloomberg and NBER recession dates.
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releases of GDP, IP, and nonfarm payroll. However, the index turned
sharply negative in early March following the release of the February
employment report.
Figure 5.5 portrays the uncertainty index, which tends to be elevated
during recessions. Although there are some nonrecessionary periods in
which the index spikes, it is interesting to note that the index increased
in early 2019, reaching highs previously seen in 2017. This suggests
that agents were less certain about the state of the economy.

Uncertainty index

Figure 5.5 Scotti Uncertainty Index

NOTE: The Scotti (2016) Uncertainty Index measures the uncertainty related to the
state of the economy. A greater (smaller) reading suggests that agents have on balance
been more (less) uncertain about business conditions.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Bloomberg and NBER recession dates.

IS A RECESSION LOOMING?
Taken together, the several indexes presented so far suggest that
business conditions in the United States have turned negative in early
2019, providing fertile ground for a downturn. Does this mean that a
recession is looming?
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In order to address such questions, we turn to the ADS index to
directly inform the probability of a recession. First off, note that forecasting a recession is a hard task, given that the NBER tends to identify
recessions only after a 12- to 18-month lag. As Hamilton (2011) puts
it, “If people could predict recessions, they probably would not happen.
Firms would not be stuck with inventories, labor, and capital they turn
out not to need, and the Federal Reserve would probably ease its policy
stance earlier.” Following a long-standing academic literature on estimating recession probabilities (see, for instance, Hamilton [2011] for
an enlightening literature review), we use a probit model. We estimate
the probability of being in a recession in the current quarter (that is, for
a forecast horizon h = 0) only as a function of the ADS index instead
of using a set of indicators. This stands as an alternative to customary
estimates of recession probabilities, as can be seen from the review of
relevant literature shown in Table 5.1, because we first embed in the
ADS factor the information from the set of variables that constitute the
ADS index, and then we feed the ADS index into the probit model. Our
approach could be defined as “aggregate, then forecast,” paraphrasing
the taxonomy laid out by Stock and Watson (2014).
Fossati (2016) estimates a small-scale dynamic factor model (DFM)
in order to estimate a recession probability probit, but his DFM contains only monthly data (the same monthly data used in the ADS index),
whereas the use of the ADS index allows us to automatically take care
of mixed-frequency data and to include information on GDP.4
Figure 5.6 shows the recession probability based on the ADS index
from 1960 to March 2019.5 The recession probabilities computed before
2009 are based on the mid-March 2019 vintage of the ADS index, while
the probabilities from 2009 to 2019 (to the right of the vertical red line)
are computed in real time using the ADS vintage available at the time
indicated on the x-axis. In other words, in the latter part of the sample,
a probit model is recursively estimated with the new ADS index that
summarizes available data up to a particular date. Generally, the model
exhibits high spikes during NBER recession periods (the gray shaded
areas). With an exception for the early-2000s recession, the estimated
probability during all the recessions reached at least 75 percent. A word
of caution on Figure 5.6: since the estimate of the probability is not in
real time before 2009, looking at the estimate before the vertical red line
could be deceiving if one intends to use the estimates to call recessions
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Table 5.1 Summary of Literature on Predicting Recessions
Reference
Stock and Watson
(1989)

Data scale
Small

Data
type

Data
freq.

Real
Monthly
financial

Stock and Watson Medium
Real
Monthly
(1991)
financial
Financial Quarterly

Model
type

Forecast
type

Realtime

Factor from
UC model

Backcasting
Nowcasting

No

Logit + factor
from UC model

Backcasting
Nowcasting

No

Markov switching
DFM

None

No

Markov switching
DFM

Backcasting
Nowcasting

No

Dynamic probit

Backcasting
Nowcasting

Yes

Diebold and
Rudebusch
(1996)

Small

Chauvet (1998)

Small

Chauvet and
Potter (2005)

Very
small

Harding and
Pagan (2006)

Large

Real

Monthly

Dating algorithm

Backcasting

No

Wright (2006)

Very
small

Real

Monthly

Probit

Forecasting

Yes

Chauvet and Piger Small
(2008)

Real

Monthly

Dating algorithm
Backcasting
Markov switching DFM

Yes

Real

Monthly

Financial Monthly

Kauppi and
Saikkonen
(2008)

Very
small

Financial Monthly

Generalized
dynamic probit

Backcasting
Nowcasting

Yes

Berge (2015)

Medium

Real
Monthly
financial

BMA logit

Backcasting
Nowcasting

Yes

Fossati (2015)

Small/
large

Dynamic probit DFM Forecasting
Markov switching DFM

Yes

Giusto and Piger
(2017)

Small

This study

Real

Monthly

Real
Monthly
financial

Small/
Real
Mixed:
medium financial/ weekly/
other
monthly/
quarterly

Vector quantization

Backcasting

Yes

BMA logit
DFM

Nowcasting

Yes

NOTE: The table presents a summary of the relevant literature on forecasting recessions at different horizons with macroeconomic and financial data. The model is
formulated but not estimated. Financial data are not revised—therefore they are, by
construction, real-time.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.

in real time. That said, we verify that for the time window in which we
have vintages of the ADS index, the real-time estimates are not drastically different from the estimate on the last vintage we used.
Figure 5.7 zooms in on the most recent 10 years and compares the
recession probabilities estimated using the mid-March 2019 ADS vin-
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Figure 5.6 Recession Probability Based on the ADS Index

NOTE: The recession probabilities computed based on the “Last Vintage ADS” use
information as of mid-March 2019, whereas probabilities based on the “Real Time
ADS” use the ADS vintages available at the time indicated on the x-axis. Grey shading indicates NBER-designated recessions.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Philadelphia Fed, ADS Business Conditions
Index.

tage with the estimate using the real-time ADS index available at the
time indicated by the x-axis. Although the real-time recession probability is more volatile when compared to the probability computed using
the last vintage of data, the real-time estimate is substantially in agreement and provides the same signal as the estimate from the last vintage
that we have used.

ADDITIONAL INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
The ADS index is a coincident indicator, and the probability computed above refers to the assessment that the economy is in recession
in the corresponding month. This analysis could be expanded in two
directions: 1) including alternative indicators as explanatory variables
(individual macroeconomic series or financial series) and 2) forecasting
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Figure 5.7 Recession Prob. Based on the ADS Index: Real-Time Versus
Last-Vintage

NOTE: The recession probabilities computed before 2009 are based on the February
2019 vintage of the ADS index, while the probabilities from 2009 to 2019 are computed in real time using the ADS vintage available at the time indicated on the x-axis.
Grey shading indicates NBER-designated recessions.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Philadelphia Fed, ADS Business Conditions
Index.

recession probabilities at different horizons. We investigate the second
issue in the empirical analysis looking at a horizon of between 0 and 12
months. With respect to the first item, we discuss here some additional
indicators that have been explored in the literature, starting from the
seminal work by Stock and Watson (1989), and then we use them in
conjunction with the ADS index to understand the quality of the incremental information that they provide in forecasting recessions. We find
that financial indicators are very useful beyond the ADS index at longer
forecast horizons.
The term spread. Stock and Watson (1989) introduce yield
spreads—in particular the spread between 10-year and 1-year T-bonds—
as useful indicators in forecasting economic activity and downturns.
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) further explore the forecasting power
of the slope of the Treasury yield curve as a leading indicator of downturns.6 Corroborating the findings in these studies, academics and market participants point to the fact that a negative slope—a negative difference between a far-off maturity, typically 10 years, and a shorter
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maturity, typically between 2 years and 3 months—generally precedes
economic recessions. Accordingly, recession probability models based
uniquely on the term spread generally associate declining term spreads
with an elevated probability of recession in the near/medium term.7 For
example, in early 2019, a simple probit model based only on the term
spread would have predicted a much higher probability of recession
in the next 12 months. In fact, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
assessed the probability of being in a recession by January 2020 at about
30 percent using information from the yield curve as of mid-March
2019.8 A variety of additional financial variables closely connected with
the yield curve have been tested in forecasting turning points in the
economy. For instance, Wright (2006) motivates the introduction of the
average of the federal funds rate over a given quarter as it provides
a measure of the impetus or restraint to the economy implied by the
stance of monetary policy.9 In addition, Wright (2006) also finds some
evidence that a measure of expected excess returns on longer-maturity
bonds, the return forecasting factor studied by Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005), is useful in predicting recessions. In our empirical evaluation in
the section titled “Real-Time Measurement of Economic Conditions,”
we use both the level of the yield curve (as in Wright ([2006]) as well
as slope and curvature.
Corporate bond spreads. Stock and Watson (1989) introduce
yield spreads as useful indicators in forecasting economic activity and
downturns, and they find that the spread between commercial paper and
Treasury bills is a leading indicator of recessions. Several other authors
have found that corporate bond spreads—also called credit spreads—
are useful indicators in predicting recessions. Stock and Watson (1989)
used the paper-bill spread, and Gertler and Lown (1999) studied the
high-yield credit spread. Both of these spreads have predictive content
on economic activity because they embed default risk, which incorporates investors’ expectations of future corporate defaults. However,
recent analysis in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) tries to distill the
information on future economic activity in bond credit spreads beyond
default risk and calls such a component the excess bond premium
(EBP). Favara et al. (2016a) use the EBP in a probit model of recessions.10 We include the most recent update of the EBP in the empirical
explorations in the next section.
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Other financial indicators. Beyond credit spreads, stock market
returns and other financial information such as the implied stock market
volatility—as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index (VIX)—have been used to predict economic activity. For
instance, Danielsson, Valenzuela, and Zer (2018) use the VIX in trying
to explain financial crises, and Engstrom (2014) uses option pricing in
trying to predict stock market crashes. We include the VIX as a regressor in the models of the section “Real-Time Management of Economic
Conditions.”

USING THE ADS INDEX WITH ADDITIONAL INDICATORS
IN FORECASTING RECESSIONS
Berge (2015) finds that the term spread and some additional financial variables are valuable leading indicators, but mostly at longer horizons—that is, at horizons of 6–12 months ahead, and beyond. Conversely, at shorter horizons, real variables appear to be more powerful
in signaling recessions.
We follow Berge (2015) and use a series of logit models, one for
each horizon from 0 to 12 months, and a variety of real and financial
explanatory variables, in order to explore the usefulness of the ADS
index. Through Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), we select the
models containing the most useful indicators at each forecast horizon,
reducing the dimensionality of our big system of models (with N indicators, we have 2N possible models).11 The individual models are at the
monthly frequency and contain a mixture of financial and real variables.
Financial variables are as follows: the level, slope, and curvature of the
yield curve; corporate bond spreads; the TED spread; the return on the
S&P500; the trade-weighted dollar index; and the VIX. For macro indicators, we compare three different sets of variables:
1) the ADS index;
2) the subset of real-activity variables used to compute the ADS
index—specifically, nonfarm payroll, industrial production,
retail sales, personal income, and a monthly average of initial
jobless claims;12
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3) a larger set of macro variables, including the variables that
make up the ADS index, plus total light vehicle sales, the ISM
purchasing managers’ index, average weekly hours, housing
permits, and the four-week moving average of unemployment
claims.
Because the NBER announces turning points with a delay, and we
do not want to incorrectly assume that a month in the recent past was or
was not a recession (that is, assigning a 0 or 1 value to the logit dependent variable), we estimate the model up to December 2017 and use
those parameter estimates in the evaluation of the recession probabilities. In this first step, our BMA approach selects the best combination
of indicators at the different horizons, as shown by the heat map of the
posterior inclusion probabilities in Figure 5.8. The darker color in the
figure indicates a higher posterior probability that a particular variable
(shown in the rows) is included in the model for that horizon (shown
in the columns). We only show results for one of the models described
above with financial and real variables.13 It should be clear from the figure that there is a predominance of darker colors in the lower-left quadrant and in the top right, indicating that real variables have higher inclusion probabilities for shorter-horizon models, while financial variables
have higher inclusion probabilities at longer horizons. An exercise in
which we separate the estimation of a real-variable model and a financial-variable model highlights this finding even more, as already noted
by Berge (2015). In fact, as shown in Figure 5.9, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for the in-sample prediction from the
1- and 12-month-ahead models point to a superior performance of the
real variables at the 1-month horizon, but a better performance of the
financial indicators at the 12-month horizon.14
We then employ data up to December 2018 to forecast our indicators through December 2019, using a random walk, and compute the
corresponding recession probabilities for each horizon based on the best
model selected in the previous step. Figure 5.10 shows such probabilities for the three combinations of real variables outlined above. Interestingly, all three models point to an increased probability of recession in
mid-2019, possibly due to the big correction observed in financial markets in late 2018. Of note, the model with the ADS index performs just
as well as the model in which the underlying series enter one by one.
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Figure 5.8 Heat Map of Posterior Inclusion Probabilities

NOTE: Posterior inclusion probabilities for each variable (rows) and each horizon (columns) related to the model with the ADS index and financial variables. Darker colors
indicate a high inclusion probability.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable
income.

A drawback to this forecast exercise is that it does not allow for
ragged edges in the data and mixed frequency, as it needs to stop at
the last point in time for which all the series are available. To overcome this issue, we reestimate the recession probabilities employing
only the ADS index as a summary statistic of the real indicators plus
GDP, which is available in real time. The estimated probabilities based
on the ADS index and financial variables as of mid-March are shown
in Figure 5.11. Based on the additional information available between
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Figure 5.9 Heat Map of Posterior Inclusion Probabilities, ROC Curves

NOTE: ROC curves for 1- and 12-month-ahead models with real or financial indicators.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable
income.

the end of 2018 and mid-March, the probability of the NBER declaring
a recession over the next year significantly decreased, in line with the
ADS-only probability from Figure 5.7.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we update and evaluate a number of economic indicators as well as recession probability models. As pointed out by Berge
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Figure 5.10 BMA Recession Probabilities, December 2018

NOTE: Probability that the NBER will declare a recession in a particular month based
on the BMA probit model. Forecast after December 2018 based on a random walk of
the various indicators. Dotted line represents the unconditional probability.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable
income.

(2015), different mixtures of real and financial variables work best at
different horizons, suggesting the need to maintain a set of models that
work well at different forecasting horizons. Because of the inability of
probit models to account for ragged edges, a real-time indicator of real
activity like the ADS index might prove useful to have more up-to-date
forecasts of recession probabilities.
The analysis of this topic, however, should not be limited to what
is described above. For example, other indicators might be considered
among the set of explanatory variables, along the lines of Engstrom
and Sharpe (2018), who further qualify the most relevant term spread
to forecast recessions. They argue that the near-term forward spread,
computed as the difference between the implied forward rate on Trea-
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Figure 5.11 BMA Recession Probabilities, Mid-March 2019

NOTE: Probability that the NBER will declare a recession in a particular month based
on the BMA probit model. Forecast after March 2019 based on a random walk of the
various indicators. Dotted line represents the unconditional probability.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable
income.

sury bills six quarters ahead and the corresponding yield on a threemonth Treasury bill, is a better predictor compared to more traditional
term spreads. The near-term forward spread can be interpreted as a
measure of the market’s expectations for the trajectory of conventional
near-term monetary policy. When negative, it indicates that market participants expect monetary policy to ease on net over the next several
quarters, presumably because they expect monetary policymakers to
respond to the threat or onset of a recession.15 The superiority of using
forward rates comes from the fact that, because yields are averages of
the forward rates spanning the period to maturity, they tend to be a noisier signal of the expected Fed actions. They corroborate this intuition by
proving that their measure outperforms in sample the term spread of the
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10-year Treasury constant maturity minus two-year Treasury constant
maturity spread sometimes used in the classical probit model.
The national financial condition indicator (NFCI) maintained by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago could also potentially be used as a
financial explanatory variable, just as the ADS index is used for real
variables.16 The NFCI index provides a comprehensive weekly update
on U.S. financial conditions in money markets, debt and equity markets, and the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. Alternatively,
because U.S. economic and financial conditions tend to be highly correlated, the adjusted NFCI (ANFCI)—an index that isolates a component of financial conditions uncorrelated with economic conditions to
provide an update on financial conditions relative to current economic
conditions—could be considered.
Recession probabilities based on macroeconomic and financial
indicators could additionally be compared to news-count measures of
recession probabilities, such as the LexisNexis index of Berge and Jordà
(2011) or the Google trends recession index also reported in Berge and
Jordà, and used in an original way to set priors of a Bayesian DFM
in Monokroussos (2015). The horizon of these news-count probabilities is, however, not clear, as articles could talk about past, current, or
future recessions. Therefore, a straight comparison with the measures
described above might not be so straightforward.17

Notes
Alessandro Barbarino and Chiara Scotti are with the Federal Reserve Board, 20th and C
Streets NW, Washington, DC 20551. The authors can be reached via email at alessandro
.barbarino@frb.gov and chiara.scotti@frb.gov. We thank Charles Horgan for excellent
research assistance. The opinions expressed here are our own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Board of Governors or its staff. This chapter was originally prepared for the 55th annual Werner Sichel Lecture Series in 2018–2019 on “Alternative
Economic Indicators” and delivered at Western Michigan University in March 2019.
1. See CBO (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2019-01/54918Outlook .pdf.
2. The ADS index is maintained and updated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia at https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/
business-conditions-index.
3. See https://www.nber.org/cycles.html.
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4. Fossati (2016) also estimates the factor from a larger scale DFM modeled after
Stock and Watson (2002), and he finds in his out-of-sample exercise that the factor
from the large-scale DFM performs better in forecasting recessions than the factor
from the small-scale DFM. In this note, we did not compare the performance of
the ADS index with the performance of the factor from a larger-scale DFM.
5. How negative should the ADS be in order to signal a recession? Berge and Jordà
(2011) show that the level of the ADS index that maximizes the ROC when
NBER recessions are the target is about −0.8017 (using the last vintage available
to them and stopping the computation in December 2007).
6. See Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998) for a thorough account of the earlier literature that links the term spread and real activity. More recently, papers that focus on the predictive power of the slope of the
yield curve for recessions include Benzoni, Chyruk, and Kelley (2018); Chauvet
and Potter (2005); Croushore and Marsten (2016); Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008);
Rudebusch and Williams (2009); and Wright (2006).
7. Notice that the slope of the yield curve does not even need to be negative to obtain
considerable spikes in the estimated probability.
8. See https://www.clevelandfed.org/our-research/indicators-and-data/yield-curve
-and-gdp-growth.aspx.
9. Wright (2006) explores both the nominal federal funds rate and the real rate (for
which inflation expectations are proxied by a four-quarter backward-looking moving average of the core personal consumption expenditures [PCE] price index).
10. Updated data on the EBP can be found in Favara et al. (2016b).
11. As in Berge (2015), we use the package BMA in R by Raftery et al. (2018) in order
to reduce the dimensionality of the problem.
12. We exclude quarterly GDP, as the model is monthly.
13. Heat maps for the other models are available upon request from the authors.
14. An ROC curve illustrates the trade-off associated with achieving a particular true
positive rate versus the corresponding false positive rate. The area under the ROC
curve (AUC) is a summary statistic measuring the classification ability of an indicator/model. The higher the AUC, the better the classification ability.
15. The only noise in this measure would be term premiums or liquidity premiums
embedded in shorter-term Treasury rates.
16. See https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/nfci/.
17. The progressive sophistication of available dictionaries for textual analysis will
make it possible to sift through finer details in texts, which will circumvent these
limitations.
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Rising Policy Uncertainty
Steven J. Davis
University of Chicago

Figure 6.1 displays a monthly index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) for the United States that I developed with Scott Baker
and Nick Bloom.1 In constructing this index, we aim to capture uncertainty about who will make economic policy decisions, what economic
policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects
of policy actions (or inaction)—including uncertainties related to the
economic ramifications of “noneconomic” policy matters, e.g., military
actions. To do so, we first count articles in 10 leading U.S. newspapers
that contain the following triple of terms: 1) “economic” or “economy”;
2) “uncertain” or “uncertainty”; and 3) one or more of “Congress,” “deficit,” “Federal Reserve,” “legislation,” “regulation,” or “White House.”
Next, we divide the raw EPU count by the number of all articles in the
same paper and month, standardize the variability of the scaled EPU
counts, and average over newspapers by month. Finally, we normalize
the mean index value to 100 from 1985 to 2009. Thus, the index value
of 284 in January 2019 is 2.84 times its 1985–2009 average.
Our U.S. EPU index spikes near tight presidential elections, Gulf
Wars I and II, the 9/11 attacks, major fiscal policy battles from 2011
to 2013, and in reaction to the June 2016 Brexit referendum, Donald
Trump’s surprise election victory in November 2016, and escalating
trade policy tensions in 2018 and 2019. The EPU index tends to rise
in recessions, but many of the largest spikes and highest index values
occur during the long, ongoing expansion that began in the second half
of 2009. Measures of policy uncertainty derived from textual analysis
of the Federal Reserve System’s periodic Beige Books and from transcripts of quarterly earnings conference calls of publicly listed firms
exhibit similar time-series patterns.2 Baker et al. (2014) present and discuss evidence that policy-related economic uncertainty in the United
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Figure 6.1 U.S. Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, 1985 to July 2019
Figure 1. US Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, 1985 to July 2019
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States followed an upward trajectory in the 1960s and 1970s, stabilized
somewhat in the 1980s and 1990s, and rose again after the late 1990s.
Using the same approach, we and others construct monthly newspaper-based EPU indices for 20 additional countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, India,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.3 We rely on own-country
newspapers in constructing the national EPU indices and perform all
searches in the language of the newspaper. To help develop suitable E,
P, and U term sets, we consulted persons with native fluency and economics expertise in the relevant language and country. Our P term set
differs across countries for reasons both obvious (e.g., using “BOJ” for
Japan) and idiosyncratic (e.g., inclusion of “customs duties” for India).
Monthly data for all 21 national EPU indices are available and regularly
updated at www.PolicyUncertainty.com.
To construct an index of global economic policy uncertainty, I proceed as follows in Davis (2016): First, I renormalize each national EPU
index to a mean of 100 from 1997 (or first year) to 2015. Second, I
impute missing values for certain countries using a regression-based
method.4 This step yields a balanced panel of monthly EPU index val-
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ues for 21 countries from January 1997 to the present. Third, I compute the global EPU index value for each month as the GDP-weighted
average of the 21 national EPU index values, using GDP data from the
IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. Figure 6.2 plots the resulting index.
The global EPU index rises sharply in reaction to the Asian and
Russian financial crises, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.-led invasion
of Iraq in 2003, the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, the European
immigration crisis in 2015, and several other developments.5 It fluctuates around consistently high levels from mid-2011 to early 2013, a
period characterized by recurring sovereign debt and banking crises in
the Eurozone, intense battles over fiscal and health-care policies in the
United States, and a generational leadership transition in China. Seven
of nine members on the Standing Committee, China’s most powerful
decision-making body, were slated for retirement in 2012. Other senior
leadership bodies in China experienced similarly high turnover rates
because of retirement, leading Li (2011) to characterize 2012 as the
fourth “generational transfer of power” in the history of Communist
Figure 6.2 Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, January 1997 to
July 2019
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China. Two previous generational transitions coincided with tragedy
and turmoil in the form of the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.
Eurozone developments in the period from mid-2011 to early 2013
include a rescue package for Portugal in May 2011, a bailout package for Greece in July 2011 (amid widespread speculation that Greece
would leave the Eurozone), large yield increases on Spanish and Italian
government bonds in August 2011, April 2012, and June 2012, a May
2012 election in which most Greek voters rejected a proposed bailout
agreement, and multiple extraordinary actions by the European Central
Bank in response to these and other developments.
Across the Atlantic, bitterly partisan disputes over the direction
of U.S. fiscal policy led to a “debt ceiling” fight in summer 2011 that
threatened to curtail critical government functions and delay payments
on U.S. Treasury securities, and an extraordinary “fiscal cliff” episode
with last-minute resolutions of major uncertainties about tax and spending policies. Uncertainties surrounding U.S. health-care policy were
also extraordinarily high in this period. For example, an appellate court
struck down the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) in August 2011,
concluding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to require
individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty, and threatening the viability of the entire act (Cooper 2011). The issue remained
unsettled until June 2012, when the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court in a surprise, closely divided decision (Bravin and Radnofsky
2012).
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its military incursions in
eastern Ukraine led to international sanctions and an uncertain environment that curtailed foreign investment in Russia and contributed to its
weak economic performance (European Parliamentary Research Service 2016). The Russia-Ukraine conflict and its unsettled nature harmed
the Ukrainian economy as well and deterred foreign investment there
(Morelli 2016). China’s aggressive pursuit of sovereignty claims in
the South China Sea has raised concerns about threats to ship-borne
trade in some of the world’s busiest international waters (Schonhardt
and Chaturvedi 2016). Recent geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf,
U.S.-led economic sanctions on Iran, and the Iranian seizure of oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz have renewed concerns about petroleum
supplies (Rachman 2019).
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Syria has been the epicenter of a many-sided military conflict and
humanitarian catastrophe since 2011, with devastating consequences
and highly uncertain long-term implications. The catastrophe produced
a flood of migrants into neighboring countries and Europe in 2014 and
2015, stoking security fears, creating anxiety about social and economic consequences, and placing enormous strains on the Schengen
Area arrangements for free mobility in a borderless Europe (Baker,
Bloom, and Davis 2015; BBC News 2016; Dustmann et al. 2016; Halla,
Wagner, and Zweimüller 2015).
Several major political and policy developments have rocked
national economies and the global economic outlook since 2016.
Leading examples include the June 2016 Brexit referendum, Donald
Trump’s upset electoral win in November of that year, and the strength
of populist political movements in several European countries. These
developments have injected new sources of political and economic
uncertainties into the global economy.
There are many other recent examples of economic uncertainty
emanating from political developments. In South Korea, political scandal led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in December
2016 and her removal from office in March 2017. In Brazil, a long
and severe recession, an extraordinary wave of corruption investigations, the criminal convictions of many leading political figures, and the
impeachment and removal of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 combined to upend the political landscape. Brazil’s new president, Michel
Temer, has promised to restore growth by reversing several major policies of his predecessor (Economist 2016). In Argentina, new fears that
the Peronist party would regain political power in upcoming elections
triggered a spectacular 15 percent depreciation of the Argentine peso on
August 12, 2019, and a 38 percent plunge in the stock market the same
day (Dube and Lewis 2019a,b; Mander 2019).
In Turkey, after squashing an attempted coup d’état in July 2016,
the government set about arresting and firing more than 100,000
teachers, military officers, judges, mayors, civil servants, and others
(Arango, Yeginsu, and Timur 2016; Yeginsu 2016). Ten weeks after the
failed coup, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded Turkey’s sovereign
credit rating, citing external funding risks, slowing growth, and “further
concerns regarding the predictability and effectiveness of government
policy and the rule of law” (Reuters 2016). The coup attempt and its
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aftermath have also strained international relations between Turkey and
several of its allies (Birnbaum and DeYoung 2016). Intense pressures
on the foreign exchange value of the Turkish lira have prompted dramatic policy moves by the Turkish Central Bank since 2018 and the
dismissal of the bank’s governor in July 2019 (Coskun 2019; GauthierVillars and Sindreu 2018; and Kantchev and Hannon 2019).

THE NEW PROMINENCE OF TRADE POLICY
UNCERTAINTY
Trade policy has become both more uncertain and more protectionist under the Trump presidency. Particulars include the U.S. withdrawal
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in January 2017,
President Trump’s early threats to jettison the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), doubts about U.S. congressional ratification of a NAFTA-replacement treaty, and a large number of tariff hikes,
tariff threats, and tariff reversals. The average U.S. tariff rate rose from
less than 2 percent in December 2017 to 4 percent in May 2019. It was
slated to reach an estimated 5–8 percent by the end of 2019.6 Threats
of additional tariff hikes would have, if fully implemented, brought
the average U.S. tariff rate to an estimated 9–11 percent by the end of
2019.7 The trade-weighted average U.S. tariff on Chinese imports rose
from 3.1 percent in 2017 to 12.4 percent in 2018 and 18.3 percent in
May 2019. Current U.S. plans would take the average U.S. tariff rate
on Chinese imports to an estimated 21.4 percent in December 2019
(Brown and Zhang 2019).
U.S. tariff hikes and President Trump’s rhetorical attacks on trading partners invite retaliation. Indeed, tit-for-tat tariff hikes between the
United States and China have been underway since April 2018. Canada,
India, Mexico, Turkey, and the European Union have also imposed new
tariffs on American imports in reaction to U.S. tariff hikes. In short, the
shift to greater protectionism in U.S. trade policy has prompted other
countries to respond in kind.
Trump administration officials often assert that the administration’s
aggressive trade policy stance will yield new trade deals that are more
favorable to the United States. Developments to date offer scant support
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for this assertion. The U.S. and South Korea renegotiated and signed
a revised Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in September 2018, but
the new agreement involves “only limited changes to the original pact”
(Schott and Jung 2018). On November 30, 2018, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, Mexican President Peña Nieto, and U.S. President Trump
signed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to replace
NAFTA. For months its ratification seemed unlikely; however, it was
finally ratified by the U.S. Congress in January of this year.8 The tone of
recent statements from the U.S. and Chinese sides suggests dim prospects in the next few months for a significant resolution of outstanding
trade policy conflicts and a reversal of recent tariff hikes. Nor is there
any sign that the United States will soon resolve its trade policy conflicts with India, Turkey, or the European Union.
Trade policy under the Trump administration also has a capricious,
back-and-forth character that amplifies uncertainty and undermines a
rules-based trading order. Less than three months after withdrawing
from the TPP, President Trump said he would consider rejoining for a
substantially better deal, only to throw cold water on the idea a few days
later (Trump 2018; Ungku and Greenfield 2018). Robert Lighthizer, the
U.S. trade representative, justified steel tariffs on the laughable grounds
that Canada, for example, presents a national security threat (Press
2018). But President Trump tweeted that tariffs on Canadian steel
were really a response to Canadian tariffs on U.S. dairy products (Byrd
2018). In August 2018, the president, for reasons unclear, tweeted that
he had “just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum
with respect to Turkey” (Ballhaus and Schlesinger 2018).
Under President Trump, tariffs are threatened, announced, delayed,
reversed, announced again, imposed, and removed—often in quick succession. Some countries get tariff exemptions, some don’t. Exemptions
vary in duration, and they come and go in a head-spinning manner.
The recent treatment of steel imports exemplifies this aspect of U.S.
trade policy under President Trump. See Brown and Kolb (2019) for a
detailed account.
Another example involves the latest round of announcements about
new tariffs on Chinese imports, which Kubota (2019) summarizes this
way: “On Aug. 1, President Trump abruptly announced on Twitter that
he would impose on Sept. 1 a 10 percent levy on roughly $300 billion
in Chinese goods, an apparent response to what he described as China’s
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failure to commit to promised U.S. agricultural purchases.” Less than
two weeks later, the plan was revised to “impose 10 percent tariffs on
$112 billion of Chinese imports starting on September 1 . . . followed
by a second round of duties on a different set of products, covering
$160 billion of imports, on December 15” (Brown 2019, p. 1). China
retaliated on August 23, announcing plans to levy new tariffs of 5 to
10 percent on $75 billion in U.S. imports. President Trump responded
later the same day, announcing that he would raise existing and planned
tariffs on $550 billon of Chinese imports by an additional 5 percentage
points (Mauldin, Leary, and Deng 2019).
Trump administration trade policy also gives greater discretion
over tariffs to bureaucrats, creating added complexity and uncertainty
for individual businesses and compelling them, as a matter of business necessity, to become enmeshed in the tariff-exemption process.
For example, the Department of Commerce rolled out a slow-working,
burdensome process for requesting company-specific exemptions from
steel and aluminum tariffs, as neatly recounted in the Wall Street Journal (Wall Street Journal Editorial Board 2018):
Companies must submit a request attesting that their imports aren’t
made in the U.S. in “a satisfactory quality” or “sufficient and reasonably available amount.” Companies must state the uses for their
steel product, their average annual consumption of the product, as
well as the number of days required to take delivery, manufacture
and ship the product. They must also estimate the maximum and
minimum composition of 24 chemical elements in their products
including molybdenum, antimony and vanadium. There are dozens of other queries, but we’ll spare you.
Oh, and a separate request is required for each width, length, grade
shape, and form of steel or aluminum product. A single company,
Primrose Alloys, has submitted more than 1,200 steel product
requests, according to Commerce’s database. All 14 that have been
reviewed so far were denied.
Businesses may also submit statements to support their requests,
which naturally turn political….

These various developments have led to a tremendous upsurge in
anxiety and uncertainty about trade policy and its economic fallout. To
attach some numbers to this point, Figure 6.3 displays a newspaperbased index of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) for the United States.
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Figure 6.3 U.S. Trade Policy Uncertainty Index, January 1985 to July
2019
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The TPU index reflects the frequency of articles in U.S. newspapers
that discuss economic policy uncertainty and trade policy matters.
Two periods stand out. The first runs from August 1992 to March
1995 and reflects uncertainties around the negotiation, ratification,
and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The second commences with Donald Trump’s election victory in November 2016. The TPU index rose above 300 in reaction to
the election outcome, the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP Agreement in
January 2017, and U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports imposed
in March 2018. It rose even higher later in 2018 and in 2019, as U.S.China trade policy conflicts intensified. The TPU index value averaged
301 from March 2018 to July 2019—7.7 times its average from 2013 to
2015 and 5.3 times its average from 1996 to 2015.
Table 6.1 presents evidence on the new prominence of trade policy
uncertainty in China and Japan as well as the United States. Like Figure
6.3, Table 6.1 relies on frequency counts of own-country newspaper
articles about trade policy uncertainty, but the scaling is different. In
Figure 6.3, the raw TPU counts are scaled by the count of all articles in
the same newspapers and normalized to 100 from 1985 to 2009. In con-
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Table 6.1 Trade Policy Share of EPU Articles, Selected Time Periods for
Three Major Economies
Time period
United States
Japan
China
1987–2015
4
8
16
2000–2015
2
7
20
NAFTA: Jan. 1992 to Dec. 2002
11
11
10
China WTO Accession: Jan. 2000 to
3
5
36
Dec. 2002
November 2016 to December 2018
15
27
48
March–December 2018
15
29
48
January–July 2019
12
29
42
NOTE: Table entries report the percentage of articles about economic policy uncertainty
that discuss trade policy matters in leading newspapers for the indicated countries.
SOURCE: Tabulated from data developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) for the
United States, Arbatli et al. (2019) for Japan, and Davis, Liu, and Sheng (2019) for
China.

trast, Table 6.1 reports the percentage of EPU articles that discuss trade
policy matters. All three countries show a dramatic rise in this percentage since November 2016, even more so since March 2018. Consider,
for example, a comparison of the 2000–2015 period to the period from
March to December in 2018: the trade policy share of EPU articles rose
from 2 to 15 percent in the United States, from 7 to 27 percent in Japan,
and from 20 to 48 percent in China. These comparisons support two
conclusions: first, the rise in trade policy uncertainty under the Trump
presidency has reverberated globally; second, the level of anxiety about
trade policy is higher for major U.S. trading partners.
Trade policy concerns have also become a major source of stock
market gyrations since 2018. For example, the S&P 500 index fell more
than 2.5 percent on March 22, 2018, reacting to news about new U.S.
tariffs on tens of billions of dollars of Chinese imports. Four days later,
the index rose more than 2.7 percent on news that the U.S. and China
had begun trade negotiations. Nevertheless, tariffs and tariff threats
between the two countries have ratcheted upward in the ensuing 15
months.
In Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Sammon (2019), my coauthors and I
examine the role of trade policy developments and 15 other news categories in large daily stock market moves. We first identified every daily
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move of more than 2.5 percent, up or down, in the U.S. stock market.
By this criterion, there were 1,114 large daily moves from January 1900
to July 2019. For each large move, we read next-day news articles in the
Wall Street Journal to classify perceptions of what moves the market.
Table 6.2 summarizes our evidence regarding the role of trade policy as a trigger for large daily moves in the U.S. stock market. The
Journal attributed 7 of 1,103 large moves from 1900 to February 2018
mainly to news about trade policy, as compared to 4 of 11 large moves
from March 2018 to July 2019.9 By this metric, the prominent role of
trade policy in recent U.S. stock market swings is historically unprecedented. In a complementary analysis, Huang et al. (2018) examine
firm-level equity returns from March 21 to March 23. They find larger
negative returns for U.S.-listed firms having greater exposure to trade
with China over this period and larger negative returns for Chineselisted firms with greater sales to the United States.
In Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Sammon (2019), my coauthors and I
take a different approach to the analysis of newspaper content. We first
use automated methods to identify articles about stock market volatility in 11 leading U.S. newspapers and to construct an “equity market
volatility” (EMV) tracker. Our newspaper-based EMV tracker performs
well in the sense that it moves closely with actual stock market volatility. Parsing the text in the EMV articles, we then quantify journalists’
perceptions of what drives volatility in equity returns and classify the
drivers into about 30 categories, many of which pertain to particular
Table 6.2 Trade Policy News Jolted the U.S. Stock Market in 2018 and
2019
Number of daily
stock market jumps
Number attributed
Percent
greater than 2.5%
to trade policy news
(%)
January 1900 to
1,103
7
0.6
February 2018
March 2018 to
11
4
35.7
July 2019
NOTE: Table reports total number of jumps, up or down, in the indicated time periods and the number attributed primarily to news about trade policy, according to the
human readings.
SOURCE: Tabulation of results from Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Sammon (2019).
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types of policy. This approach lets us assess the importance of each category to the average level of stock market volatility and its movements
over time.
As seen in Figure 6.4, trade policy gets attention in 26 percent of
articles about equity market volatility in leading U.S. newspapers from
March to December 2018. In glaring contrast, trade policy matters
receive attention in a mere 2.7 percent of articles about equity market
volatility from 1985 to 2015.10 In other words, trade policy went from
a virtual nonfactor in U.S. equity market volatility in recent decades to
one of its leading sources in 2018.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Politics and policy decision-making are often messy and fraught
with uncertainty about political outcomes, policy decisions, near-term
consequences, and long-term implications. The previous two sections
offer a variety of examples, many of them recent, drawn from countries
around the world. They include the U.S. debt-ceiling crisis in August
2011, the U.S. fiscal cliff and government shutdown episodes in 2012
and 2013, the Syrian catastrophe, multiple Eurozone crises since 2010,
Russian military incursions in Ukraine, the European immigration crisis,
the ongoing Brexit saga, a coup attempt and crackdown in Turkey, the
removal of South Korea’s president, corruption scandals and presidential removal in Brazil, a sharp escalation of U.S.-China trade policy conflicts in 2018 and 2019, and more. These examples illustrate the role of
governments and political processes as sources of economic uncertainty.
That uncertainty weighs negatively on economic performance. At least
in a proximate sense, causality runs from political processes and policy
uncertainty to aggregate economic performance in these examples.
Economic developments also give rise to uncertainty, directly and
through their impact on policy making. As a leading example, the global
financial crisis of 2007–2009 confronted policymakers with extraordinary and complex challenges, especially in the immediate wake of the
financial panic in September 2008. There was great uncertainty about
how policymakers should and would respond, and what would be the
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Figure 6.4 Percent of Articles about Equity Market Volatility in Leading
U.S. Newspapers That Discuss Trade Policy Matters, 1985 to
2018
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economic consequences. In this episode, the financial crisis and its
economic fallout drove a sharp rise in policy uncertainty. In turn, high
policy uncertainty contributed to the severity of the crisis and the weakness of the ensuing recovery.
There is also evidence that major financial crises lead to higher
levels of policy uncertainty for many years. Funke, Schularick, and
Trebesch (2016) draw on data for many countries over 140 years to
document a pattern of rising political polarization in the years following
systemic financial crises, contributing to higher levels of policy uncertainty. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014) also find evidence that financial
crises breed political polarization, which sometimes results in political
gridlock and policy uncertainty.
A key point: the potential for negative shocks to drive policy uncertainty depends on the underlying environment, which is partly shaped by
past policy decisions.11 Consider again the global financial crisis. It was
precipitated by a collapse in U.S. housing prices and mortgage-backed
security values (Mian and Sufi 2014). The shock was large, and many
banks were highly exposed to it. The shock led to a systemic financial
crisis, because banks were poorly capitalized and heavily dependent on
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flight-prone forms of debt to fund their investments. If policymakers
had required banks to rely more heavily on run-proof funding, the crisis
would have been less severe—and perhaps would have been avoided
altogether. In this and other respects, the precrisis regulatory regime set
the stage for a major financial crisis (Admati and Hellwig 2013; Duffie
2019) and the ensuing policy uncertainty.
As another example, there is less need for discretionary fiscal stimulus in response to negative shocks when robust automatic fiscal stabilizers are in place. Automatic fiscal stabilizers lessen the political conflicts, decision delays, implementation lags, and policy uncertainty that
come with efforts to deploy discretionary fiscal tools. Especially when
monetary policy is hampered by an effective lower bound on policy
rates, inadequate or poorly designed automatic fiscal stabilizers practically ensure that political leaders will turn to discretionary fiscal policy
as a response to the next large economic downturn.
High policy uncertainty in the past decade has stimulated empirical research on its economic consequences. Durnev (2012), Giavazzi
and McMahon (2012), Julio and Yook (2012, 2016), and Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi (2016), among others, investigate the effects of election-related uncertainty on corporate investment, international capital
flows, precautionary savings, and stock price volatility. By and large,
this literature finds that election-related uncertainty reduces investment, discourages inward foreign direct investment (FDI), raises precautionary savings, and increases stock price volatility. Aaberge, Liu,
and Zhu (2017) find that political uncertainty associated with the 1989
Tiananmen Square movement led to sharp savings increases by Chinese households. Wiemann and Lumsdaine (2019) find that increases
in uncertainty about U.S. health-care policy lowers the consumption
spending of married households, more so for those with worse health.
Handley and Limão (2015) develop evidence that lower uncertainty
about trade policy stimulates investment in export capacity. Caldara et
al. (2019) find evidence that higher trade policy uncertainty since 2017
has dampened U.S. business investment.12 Gulen and Ion (2016) find
negative effects of policy uncertainty on corporate investment using the
U.S. EPU measure in Figure 6.1. Similarly, Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2016) find larger negative effects of EPU on investment rates and
employment growth, and larger positive effects on stock price volatility, for firms with greater exposure to policy risks. Hassan et al. (2019)
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use transcripts of earnings conference calls to construct time-varying
measures of firm-level policy uncertainty. They also find that higher
uncertainty discourages investment and employment. Using the EPU
index for India, Anand and Tulin (2014) find negative effects of policy
uncertainty on firm-level investment flows, with stronger effects on
new projects.
A larger literature considers the effects of economic uncertainty in
general, rather than policy uncertainty in particular. Important early analyses of how income uncertainty affects consumption behavior include
Carroll (1997), Kimball (1990), and Zeldes (1989). Eberly (1994) finds
that high uncertainty leads households to defer costly-to-reverse purchases of durable goods. Bloom (2009) finds that high uncertainty leads
firms to cut or delay investment expenditures. These two studies and
many others stress that heightened uncertainty provides an incentive
to delay or forgo investments that are costly to reverse. Uncertainty
can also depress investment by raising risk premiums, as stressed by
Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2016); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2014); Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014); and Pastor and Veronesi
(2013). Insofar as high uncertainty depresses investment and discourages the reallocation of capital and labor, it also slows the growth of
productivity and output. See Bloom (2014) for a fuller discussion of
how uncertainty affects economic activity.
Another branch of the literature investigates the dynamic relationship of policy uncertainty, or economic uncertainty more broadly, to
macroeconomic performance. Examples include Arbatli et al. (2019);
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016); Baker, Bloom, and Terry (2016);
Colombo (2013); Ghirelli, Pérez, and Urtasun (2019); International
Monetary Fund (2013); Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015); Leduc and
Liu (2016); and Stock and Watson (2012). These studies typically find
that higher (policy) uncertainty foreshadows a deterioration in macroeconomic performance. Romer (1990) marshals evidence that the 1929
stock market crash triggered a sharp rise in income uncertainty that led
households to forgo purchases of consumer durables, accentuating the
collapse of aggregate demand at the onset of the Great Depression. Evidence in Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta (2017) suggests that high
policy uncertainty depresses international trade in goods and services.
In summary, a variety of studies find evidence that high policy
uncertainty undermines economic performance by leading firms
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to delay or forgo investments and hiring, by slowing productivityenhancing factor reallocation, and by depressing consumption expenditures. This evidence points to a positive payoff in the form of stronger macroeconomic performance if policymakers can deliver greater
predictability in the policy environment. A smaller literature finds that
greater uncertainty causes households and firms to become less responsive on the margin to cuts in interest rates and taxes, in line with predictions of real options theory. See Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola (2013);
Bertola, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2005); Bloom (2009); Bloom, Bond,
and Van Reenen (2007); and Vavra (2014). These studies suggest that a
stronger policy framework also increases the potency of countercyclical stabilization policies.

CONCLUSION
U.S. and global policy uncertainty have been highly elevated
in recent years. According to Figure 6.1 and evidence in Baker et al.
(2014), the past dozen years have seen the highest levels of U.S. economic policy uncertainty in the past 60 years. According to Figure 6.2,
global EPU in 2017 and 2018 is running at even higher levels than during the global financial crisis. The huge rise in trade policy uncertainty
since early 2018 is an extraordinary departure from recent history, as is
the prominent role of trade policy in recent stock market volatility.
There is now a sizable body of empirical research that supports the
proposition that high policy uncertainty harms macroeconomic performance. The evidence in this literature implies that greater predictability in the policy environment yields better macroeconomic performance. A smaller literature suggests that standard monetary and fiscal
policy tools are also more effective in environments with greater policy
predictability.
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Notes
This chapter, prepared in connection with the Werner Sichel Lecture Series at Western
Michigan University, draws on my research with Scott Baker, Nick Bloom, and others
in Arbatli et al. (2019); Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016); Baker, Bloom, Davis, and
Kost (2019); Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Sammon (2019); Davis (2016); and Davis, Liu,
and Sheng (2019). I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the U.S. National
Science Foundation and the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago.
1. See Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Monthly updates are available at www.Policy
Uncertainty.com.
2. See Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) on Beige Books and Hassan et al. (2019) on
earnings calls.
3. See Cerda, Silva, and Valente (2016) on the EPU index for Chile; Baker, Bloom,
Davis, and Wang (2013) for China; Gil and Silva (2018) for Colombia; Hardouvelis et al. (2018) for Greece; Zalla (2016) for Ireland; Arbatli et al. (2019) for Japan;
Kroese, Kok, and Parlevliet (2015) for the Netherlands; Ghirelli, Pérez, and Urtasun (2019) for Spain; and Armelius, Hull, and Köhler (2017) for Sweden. EPU
data for the other countries are updates to the indices developed in Baker, Bloom,
and Davis (2016) and new indices that we developed using the same methods.
4. For example, I regress the EPU index for Australia from 1998 onward on contemporaneous EPU index values for all countries with no missing data. I then use
predicted values from this regression to impute the missing Australian values for
1997.
5. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) present and discuss a suite of newspaper-based
indices of immigration-related fears and policy uncertainty for France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Updates are available at http://www
.policyuncertainty.com/immigration_fear.html.
6. I am unaware of authoritative, up-to-the-moment statistics on average U.S. tariff
rates. Statistics cited in the text are a composite of estimates attributed to Deutsche
Bank and UBS Group in Douglas (2019) and a chart attributed to Oxford Economics in Borodovsky (2019).
7. These figures are also estimates reported in Borodovsky (2019) and Douglas
(2019). They do not incorporate President Trump’s announcement on August 23,
2019, of additional tariff hikes on Chinese imports.
8. In August 2019, PredictIt assessed only a 30 percent probability that “both houses
of the U.S. Congress shall ratify the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, by
passing a bill to implement such agreement” by the end of 2019. See also Marcos
(2019) and Werner, Lynch, and Rauhala (2019). However, the House ratified it that
December, and the Senate followed suit on January 16 of this year.
9. The four dates and the corresponding value-weighted returns on the S&P 500 are
March 22, 2018, −2.52 percent; March 26, 2018, 2.72 percent; December 4, 2018,
−3.24 percent; and January 4, 2019, 3.43 percent.
10. To construct Figure 6.4, we first compute the ratio (count of EMV articles that
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contain trade policy terms)/(count of all EMV articles) in each month from January 1985 to December 2018. The “count of all EMV articles” in the denominator
is the number of articles in 11 leading U.S. newspapers that contain at least one
term in each of the following three sets: (E)conomy: {economic, economy, financial}; Stock (M)arket: {stock market, equity, equities, Standard and Poors, Standard & Poors, Standard and Poor, Standard and Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s}; and
(V)olatility: {uncertain, uncertainty, volatility, volatile, risk, risky}. The numerator is the count of the subset of EMV articles that also contain one or more terms
in Trade Policy: {trade policy, tariff, import duty, import barrier, import restriction, trade quota, dumping, export tax, export duty, trade treaty, trade agreement,
trade act, WTO, World Trade Organization, Doha round, Uruguay round, GATT,
export restriction, investment restriction, NAFTA, North American Free Trade
Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership, TransPacific Partnership, Federal Maritime Commission, International Trade Commission, Jones Act, trade adjustment
assistance}.
11. The effects of policy uncertainty also depend on the environment. For example,
Basu and Bundick (2017) and Nakata (2017) examine uncertainty shocks in New
Keynesian models. Both papers conclude that higher uncertainty has a larger negative effect on output when the monetary authority’s policy rate is closer to the
zero bound. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2017) find empirical support
for this prediction.
12. Although they cannot cleanly disentangle uncertainty effects from (negative)
anticipation effects, Altig et al. (2019) report survey evidence that trade policy
developments in 2018 caused a small drop in U.S. business investment. Similarly,
Bloom et al. (2019) find survey evidence that Brexit-related developments have
caused a sizable drop in U.K. business investment over the past three years.
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Measuring Economies from Space
Adam Storeygard
Tufts University

Why do we use satellite data for economic research and policymaking? Satellite data have several features that help us answer the kinds
of causal questions about economic phenomena, and the effects of policies, that we care about as economists and policymakers. In particular,
there are six advantages that I see as key. In this chapter, I address each
one in turn, highlighting one or two pieces of economics research that
use each and what we can learn from them. This chapter deals with data
and methods, but throughout I’ll show how they’ve been used to generate some very concrete lessons that are relevant to policy.1

SIX ADVANTAGES OF SATELLITE DATA
The first advantage of satellite data is that they exist where other
data do not. Collecting data via household surveys and censuses is
expensive and can be logistically difficult, especially in poor countries.
The same is true of many kinds of administrative data that rich countries regularly collect.
To take an extreme example, Lee (2018) uses satellite data on lights
at night from North Korea, a country that essentially does not publish
credible economic data, to study the effect of sanctions there. Relying
on the fact that changes in lighting are correlated with changes in economic activity, as demonstrated by Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil
(2012), Lee uses the lights data to show that sanctions pushed economic
activity toward Pyongyang (Figure 7.1) and to cities where trade with
China was concentrated. China was not part of the sanctions regime.
He argues that instead of primarily punishing ruling elites, as intended,
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Figure 7.1 Lights Near Pyongyang, North Korea, in 1992, 2002, and 2012

SOURCE: Lee (2018).

sanctions thus likely had their largest impacts on the “already marginalized hinterlands” (Lee 2018, p. 34).
A lack of data, of course, affects many places other than North
Korea, in less extreme ways. In my work focused on how African cities grow, I have used the same night lights data as a measure of citylevel economic activity, because other sources are rarely available, and
almost never for every year. The paper by Henderson, Storeygard, and
Deichmann (2017) considers how a drying climate throughout much of
sub-Saharan Africa over a 50-year period (Figure 7.2) affected cities.
The authors demonstrate that a drying climate appears to have pushed
economic activity into some African cities but not others. Consistent
with a simple theory, it is the cities most likely to have a preexisting
export manufacturing base that attract new activity in times of drought,
while cities that are more local in orientation are not affected. In the theory, the manufacturing-oriented cities are less affected by the drought
because it affects neither their production technology nor the demand
for their products. The more locally oriented cities, however, face a
drop in demand from their customers: local farmers, whose production
and therefore income fall.
These lights data have been used to address many other questions
in data-poor environments, including how transport costs affect African cities (Storeygard 2016) and the effects of refugee camps on local
economies in Kenya (Alix-Garcia et al. 2018).
A second advantage is that satellite data are often collected at
extremely high spatial resolution, sometimes now less than one square
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Figure 7.2 Moisture Change in Africa, from the Period of 1950–1969 to
the Period of 1990–2009
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meter. Jayachandran et al. (2017) have used this feature to evaluate a
program of payments for ecosystem services in rural Uganda. The program paid private forest owners not to cut down trees for up to two
years. The satellite data are fine enough that one can detect individual
trees and assign them to the land of an individual household. Figure 7.3
shows what happened in four particular sample locations, each corresponding to a row in the figure. The first two columns of images show
trees at the beginning and end of the two-year period, and the last column shows changes in tree cover. The authors link these data with a
household survey about the program, using the location of each household’s land. This link is of course critical—very little social science can
be done with remote data alone. The authors found that people who
were randomly assigned to the payments group cut down substantially
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Figure 7.3 Changes in Forest Cover on Four Plots in Uganda
Time 1

Time 2

Change Map

Cloud
Other land cover
Persistent tree cover
Tree cover decrease
Tree cover increase

SOURCE: Jayachandran et al. (2017). Reprinted with permission from AAAS.

fewer trees than a control group that did not receive payments, and that
the payments group did not displace tree harvesting onto other nearby
lands. The difference was large enough that even if these effects were
completely undone in four years, this delay in cutting down trees would
be a cost-effective means of decreasing carbon emissions.
A third advantage is that repeat measurements with satellites are
extremely cheap. Once analysts develop the methods for measuring
something once, the satellite keeps orbiting and collecting data, so they,
and often others, can apply the same algorithm to next month’s or next
year’s data.
An excellent example of this is work done on ethnic patronage in
the Kibera neighborhood of Nairobi, Kenya, by Marx, Stoker, and Suri
(2019). These three authors are interested in the rents people pay relative to the quality of their house, but housing quality can vary over time.
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To get a proxy for that, they measured the reflectance of the metal roofs
(i.e., the amount of light reflected off the roofs). Roofs get less reflective as they get rustier (Figure 7.4, left and right lower yellow boxes),
but when they get replaced, their shiny surfaces reflect more light (left
and right upper yellow boxes). The authors were able to extract four
measures of this reflectance for the whole neighborhood over a short
period of time. Again, they could link the images of each house with a
survey respondent.
The authors were able to document and quantify the fact that renters
pay less rent, and get better housing quality, when they are of the same
ethnicity as the local political boss. Conversely, they pay more rent and
get worse housing quality when their landlord is of the same ethnicity
as the local political boss.
In addition to reporting data for many points in time, most satellites report data for nearly the whole world on a regular basis. This
was particularly useful for a study on the effect of subway systems on
air pollution by Gendron-Carrier et al. (2018). The authors wanted to
see whether air pollution fell in the weeks and months after subways
Figure 7.4 Changes in Roof Reflectivity from Old and New Roofs in
Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, July 2009 to August 2012

NOTE: “Both pictures are taken over the same area of the slum with the same resolution (0.5 meters panchromatic). The picture in the left panel was taken in July 2009
and that in the right panel in August 2012. The yellow rectangles highlight clusters
of roofs that markedly evolved over the period. Roofs highlighted in the bottom rectangle degraded, while roofs within the top rectangle were upgraded in the same time
frame” (Marx, Stoker, and Suri 2019, online appendix).
SOURCE: Marx, Stoker, and Suri (2019).
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opened, as was the case for Bangalore in 2014 (Figure 7.5). But not
many cities have seen subways open in the past 20 years.
Conveniently, satellite data on particulate matter are available for
the whole world, so Gendron-Carrier et al. (2018) gathered administrative data on the opening of each subway stop in the 42 cities with new
systems, which they were able to link to the pollution data. Without so
many cities, they would not have had the statistical power for reliable
inference.
Their results are quite striking. They find that subways substantially
reduce particulates, and that the effect does not tend to decrease for as
long as they can see in their sample, which is about eight years after
the opening of the subway. This is somewhat surprising, as much other
work, from Downs (1962) to Duranton and Turner (2011), predicts that
new drivers will exploit any reduction in automobile traffic.
A feature related to the worldwide coverage is that satellites are
measuring the same quantity everywhere. They don’t turn off or change
Figure 7.5 Air Pollution before and after Inauguration of a New Subway
Line in Bangalore

NOTE: Stations shown as small circles. Darker grid cells represent higher levels of
particulates, and the large circle has a radius of 10 kilometers, centered on the central
business district.
SOURCE: Gendron-Carrier et al. (2018).
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methods when they cross a national border. This is different from even
highly standardized surveys such as the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) carried out in many countries, because at a minimum, they
must translate the same questions into different languages. Burgess,
Costa, and Olken (2018) have exploited this idea of consistency across
borders to consider the effect of a policy that Brazil introduced in 2006
to reduce deforestation. There are many reasons why deforestation rates
change from year to year—including, for example, market prices of
agricultural products farmers plan to grow on cleared land—so it’s hard
to distinguish the policy from other phenomena.
To address this, Burgess, Costa, and Olken (2018) use a spatial
regression discontinuity design, as illustrated in Figure 7.6. Each point
in each graph represents the share of forest in a 2.5-kilometer-wide
swath of land parallel to Brazil’s border cut down in a given year. This
is equivalent to measuring deforestation along a transect crossing the
border and then aggregating appropriately across all such transects. In
the early years in the top row (2001–2005), when one moves from left
to right into Brazil, rates of deforestation increase dramatically preFigure 7.6 Deforestation Rates by Year and Distance to the Brazilian
Border

NOTE: Average forest cover lost as a function of distance to the Brazilian border by
year. Each point represents a 2.5-kilometer-wide band, indexed by distance into Brazil
from the border, where negative values are in a neighboring country.
SOURCE: Burgess, Costa, and Olken (2018).
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cisely at the border, represented by the vertical line in the middle. However, starting in 2006, that differential falls considerably, and by 2009 it
is barely detectable. This is striking evidence that something important
changed in Brazil relative to its neighbors in 2006, and the authors posit
that this policy is the most likely candidate. Note that with coarser data,
say at the district level, it would be more difficult to determine whether
the jump happened precisely at the border.
The last advantage of satellites that I will highlight is their independence from typical reporting mechanisms. This is especially important
when local officials might have incentives to underreport environmental damage, for example, but it has broader implications.
In an earlier paper, Burgess et al. (2012) look at how deforestation
changed during rapid redistricting in Indonesia in the 2000s (Figure
7.7). By exploiting quirks in the timing of these changes, they show that
redistricting led to more rapid deforestation. Their results are consistent
with a model of Cournot competition in which the redistricting increased
competition between districts for the revenue from legal and illegal logging.2 A similar strategy has been used to investigate pollution in China,
where the accuracy of official reporting has been called into question,
with mixed results (Chen et al. 2012, 2013; Bombardini and Li 2019).
Even in the absence of outright falsification, the availability of a
measure independent of traditional data sources is useful to reduce
measurement error. Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) show this
in combining data on lights growth with traditional GDP growth data.
In essence, both lights and traditional GDP are subject to measurement
error, but since the sources of their measurement error are very different, they are likely to be uncorrelated, and thus the two measures can
be combined to form better estimates.3 Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin
(2016) invoke a similar method in using lights to determine whether
national accounts or household survey data provide more reliable estimates of national incomes.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
To highlight these six advantages of spatial data, I have described
examples related to deforestation, pollution, urban growth, transporta-
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Figure 1: Forest cover change in the province of Riau, 2001-2008

Figure 7.7 Forest Cover in Riau Province, Indonesia, 2001–2008
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SOURCE: Burgess et al. (2012), by permission of Oxford University Press.
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tion, and political economy. There are many more in economics, on topics as varied as tourism (Faber and Gaubert 2019) and economic history
(Pascali 2017), not to mention a much longer tradition in other fields,
especially environmental science.
Another area that holds particular promise for the future is agriculture, especially in the developing world. It is not easy to learn a lot about
crop choice or yield from a single satellite image. But once multiple
images per growing season are available—or, even better, images every
day—it starts becoming possible to learn an enormous amount about
the agricultural economy. And with higher frequency high-resolution
images, I expect that we will be able to learn about the choices of individual farmers at increasingly low cost.4
While I believe that this technology holds great promise, I do not
want to give the impression that it can replace traditional data sources,
or that it is without problems. The view from above is a powerful one,
but it is not a complete one, and traditional administrative or survey data
are critical to have in nearly all of the examples described above. Any
given satellite image is a snapshot at one instant in time, not a summary
of a day or a month that one could get, for example, from a pollution
monitoring station. The most recent night-lights sensors,5 for another
example, provide data from two o’clock in the morning—as opposed to
the early evening, as earlier satellites did—and so researchers will have
to study whether that changes their relationship with economic activity.
Satellites do not last forever, so repeat measurements over long periods
require launching new satellites and adapting measurement techniques
to them. It is still difficult to delineate objects like building footprints
from a satellite image. Computers are getting better at that, but it’s not
yet routine, so it often requires lots of human labor. And while it is true
that satellites generally operate the same way regardless of their location, context still matters. For example, an algorithm that is good at
distinguishing a city from a surrounding forest does not always work
as well in distinguishing a city from a surrounding desert. So, as in
everything, it is important to know one’s data well before attempting
to interpret it.
To briefly summarize, satellites provide data for data-poor contexts, often at high resolution, with frequent repeat measurement, for
the whole world, consistently across borders, in a way that is difficult
to falsify because they are generally independent from traditional data
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providers. They are not magic, but as the price of data and processing
power goes down and algorithms for analyzing them get better, they
hold enormous potential for learning about economics and policy.

Notes
This chapter is based on the opening keynote address of the World Bank Land and
Poverty Conference 2019, drawing on material from the Sichel Lecture delivered at
Western Michigan University on October 10, 2018, and on Donaldson and Storeygard
(2016). As Donaldson and Storeygard make clear, the economics literature using satellite data relies heavily on a much larger and older (but still rapidly developing) technical
literature on the engineering and science of remote sensing.
1. For more details on satellite data and their use in economics, see Donaldson and
Storeygard (2016), especially the references therein.
2. Note that redistricting could cause more mundane difficulties in reporting as
well, as new district governments come into being, even in the absence of illegal
motives.
3. This is slightly complicated by the fact that the units of the lights-based estimate
are unknown. By analogy, if one weighs oneself with two different scales, both
using kilograms as their unit of account, a simple mean of the two measurements
is the optimal combination (unless one knows something about their relative precision). However, if one of the scales has an unknown unit of account, then its
relationship to kilograms must be measured using the same data.
4. See Lobell (2013) and, for a recent developing-world example, Burke and Lobell
(2017).
5. Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS).
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